The position of the petitioner

The petitioner notes that in 1979 she was appointed judicial clerk (secretaria judicial) of a
labor court in the city of Lima. Subsequently, by Law No. 23,344, of December 19, 1981 and Law No. 23,369 of
December 31, 1981, the appointment and ratification of judicial clerks, judges, and reporters was regulated. In
order to carry out those statutory mandates, a special committee was formed for carrying out the processes of
ratifying judicial clerks. Accordingly, having concluded the evaluation stage, on September 13, 1982, the
President of the Plenary Chamber of the Court of Labor and Labor Communities of Lima (hereinafter “Labor
Court”) informed the alleged victim that she had not been ratified, and that she would no longer continue in
her job, as she was removed from her position as judicial clerk. According to the petitioner, she was never given
written notice of that decision and subsequently was kept from entering her place of work.
Given the situation described, and also calling into question the fact that she had no right to
defense in the ratification process, on September 17, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for review (recurso de
revisión) against the decision of the Labor Court, to have her case administratively processed before the
Supreme Court of Justice (hereinafter “the Supreme Court”). Nonetheless, she states that the Supreme Court
found that her motion was unfounded, by Supreme Resolution of October 12, 1983, without engaging in any
review of the record of ratifications. The petitioner filed a writ of amparo against that judgment, with was
declared to be inadmissible on procedural grounds by the Twelfth Civil Court of Lima (hereinafter “Civil Court”)
on June 14, 1985. For this reason, she filed a motion of appeal (recurso de apelación) before the Third Civil
Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima, which upheld the judgment that she challenged on August 2,
Accordingly, on September 19, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion for nullity (recurso de
nulidad) before the Second Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. In the context of the proceeding, after analyzing
the record, the Supreme Prosecutor ruled on January 17, 1986, that the judgments at trial and on appeal were
resolved without having reviewed the record of ratifications, accordingly those resolutions should be
considered null and void and a new judgment should be handed down. In view of the foregoing, the Supreme
Court, on August 4, 1986, annulled the judgment on appeal and vacated the ruling of the trial court, ordering
that the trial judge, that is, the Civil Court, issue a judgment revising that record.
The petitioner states that for 10 years she sought, on numerous occasions, to have the record
of ratifications removed by the Labor Court to the Civil Court, but it answered that it had been lost, failing in its
duty to replace the documents. In view of the foregoing, she notes that on December 30, 1996, the Sixteenth
Civil Court of Lima issued a judgment once again without reviewing the record of ratifications, and finding the
writ of amparo to be without foundation.
Against this resolution, which once again failed to abide by what was ordered by the Supreme
Court, the alleged victim filed a motion of appeal on May 19, 1997. Nonetheless, on March 20, 1998, the
Transitory Corporate Chamber of Public Law upheld the judgment appealed. Subsequently, on April 8, 1998,
alleging the repeated violation of due process guarantees, the petitioner filed a motion for annulment with the
Constitutional and Social Law Chamber of the Supreme Court, which found no ground for annulment in the
judgment appealed, by resolution notice of which was given on September 23, 1999.
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner alleges that the State violated the rights recognized in
Articles 5, 8, 11, and 25 of the American Convention to her detriment.

The position of the State

The State argues that the petitioners at all times enjoyed the judicial guarantees necessary and
that the fact that its claims were dismissed does not imply a violation of her fundamental rights, for the judicial
protection recognized in the Convention includes the right to fair, impartial, and swift procedures that offer the
possibility but not necessarily a guarantee of a favorable outcome. It also states that the petitioner, during her

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