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expression, and, on the other, the right to have one’s honor respected and one’s
dignity recognized, as set forth in Article 11. Both are related –though this is not the
object of the Judgment and of my opinion- to the right to reply or to make a
correction as set forth in Article 14(1) where “offensive or inaccurate statements
have been made.” Said collision is particularly relevant these days, characterized by
the massive deployment of powerful mass media, and raises different and often
contrary opinions which derive in different legal determinations.
6.
The discussion of these issues, which usually poses dilemmas of difficult, and
-in any case- controversial solutions, gives rise to relevant opinions on the role of
freedom of thought and expression in a democratic society, an issue which the Court
has firmly determined in prior cases -as I stated in paragraph 3 supra- and on the
respect commanded by the right to privacy and to have one’s name and reputation
respected, also known as the right to have one’s honor respected and one’s dignity
recognized, which must be discussed within the cultural context which defines and
protects them and which may be damaged by the abusive exercise of freedom of
thought and expression. The relationship between the subject matter of said
adjudicatory cases and my unchanging opinion on such issues explains why in this
judgment I repeatedly refer to the opinion I issued in the first above-mentioned
case.
7.
We are at the meeting point of two rights which are to be protected and
reconciled. Both are afforded the superior hierarchy of human rights and are subject
to the requirements and guarantees which are stated in the “contemporary statute of
rights and freedoms” of individuals. We would never seek to abolish one of them –as
it occurs under authoritative arguments-, alleging that the exercise of some rights
implies the annulment or impairment of others, as this would amount to going in a
direction which is as obscure as predictable.
8.
Now, the facts of this adjudicatory case (that is, the statements made by the
author of a book, their impact on the honor of a judge and the legal action brought
by the latter), when discussed under their own terms and regarding the
acknowledgment made by the State, do not have the characteristics which might
encourage a lengthy debate on the collision of rights.
9.
Even though, the Court has set to define, through a systematic analysis of the
validity and operation of the restrictions on freedom of thought and expression, the
elements which might justify such restrictions in light of the general principles of
Human Rights International Law. This contributes to the assessment and
characterization of some requirements set forth in Article 13 –legality, necessity, and
suitability in terms of certain lawful purposes- which regulate the matter of
restrictions and which may also be applied to the analysis of Articles 31 and 32(2) of
the Convention. This guideline for the discussion of restrictions –and the
legitimization of legal responses-, is a useful methodological contribution of the
Judgment rendered in the case of Kimel to the development of the case law of the
Inter-American Court and to the arguments which explain and justify the Court’s
decisions.
10.
Naturally, the analysis of the Inter-American Court has taken into
consideration that the rights enshrined in the Convention are not absolute, in that
their exercise may not have limitations or be subject to legitimate controls. Such
notion would deprive individuals of the protection afforded by law and would leave
social order at the mercy of power and discretion. The exercise of rights does have