Supreme Court of Justice, which on October 12, 1983, determined that the motion for review was unfounded, without giving her the opportunity to present evidence in support of her case. 8. She indicated that she filed an amparo motion (acción de amparo) against the resolution of October 12, 1983, before the 12th Civil Court of Lima, which found this action inadmissible on June 14, 1985. 9. She argued that on July 1, 1985, she filed a motion of appeal (recurso de apelación) against the amparo decision, before the Third Civil Chamber, which upheld the ruling on September 2, 1985. She said she then filed a motion for nullity (recurso de nulidad) before the same Chamber, which removed the proceedings up to the Second Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice. 10. She said that the Supreme Prosecutor told that Chamber that the resolutions on the amparo action of June 14, 1985 and on the amparo appeal of September 2, 1985 were issued without taking into account the record of the ratification process such that it was not possible for it to determine whether the Labor Tribunal (Tribunal de Trabajo) had or had not committed the irregularities alleged by the petitioner. 11. She indicated that following that opinion, on August 4, 1986 the Supreme Court of Justice voided the judgment of September 2, 1985 and ordered the judge in the case to issue a new ruling, taking into account the record from the ratification process. 12. The petitioner indicated that more than 10 years later, on December 30, 1996, the 16th Civil Court of Lima issued a new amparo decision in which it once again determined that the action was unfounded. She said that this ruling ignored what was ordered by the Supreme Court; accordingly, she filed a motion of appeal (recurso de apelación) on May 19, 1997, which was denied by the Transitional Corporative Chamber Specialized in Public Law, on March 20, 1998. 13. She stated that in response to that decision, she filed a motion for nullity before the Supreme Court, arguing that a series of procedural errors made by the Corporative Chamber led it to find the motion inadmissible on October 29, 1998. 14. With respect to the law, she argued a violation of her rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection, because in the context of the proceeding that removed her from her position she did not have an opportunity to defend herself or present evidence, and because of the unreasonable delay in the proceeding, which lasted more than 16 years. 15. She also argued a violation of the right to work, because she was removed from her employment through an irregular proceeding that did not comply with due process standards. B. The State 16. The State did not controvert the facts of the process narrated by the petitioner. In this respect, it indicated that the alleged victim was subjected to a process of ratification in keeping with Law No. 23369, which establishes that those public officials that were not ratified in this process would have the opportunity to file a motion for review before the Supreme Court. It stated that as this process unfolded Ms. Moya Solís was not ratified, thus she filed a motion for review before the Supreme Court, which declared the motion unfounded on October 12, 1983. 17. As regards the law, the State indicated that there were no violations of judicial guarantees or judicial protection. It indicated that in the context of the proceedings that culminated in the separation of the petitioner from her position as clerk of court all due process guarantees were respected and the proceedings were conducted fairly, impartially, and speedily. It specifically said that the petitioner had the opportunity to mount her defense, and to pursue all judicial remedies available in the domestic legislation. The State further argued that the fact of having received unfavorable results does not imply a violation of the rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection.