Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil Judgment of July 6, 2009 (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs) In the case of Escher et al., the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Court” or “the Court”), composed of the following judges: Cecilia Medina Quiroga, President Diego García-Sayán, Vice President Sergio García Ramírez, Judge Manuel E. Ventura Robles, Judge Leonardo A. Franco, Judge Margarette May Macaulay, Judge Rhadys Abreu Blondet, Judge, and Roberto de Figueiredo Caldas, Judge ad hoc, also present, Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, Secretary, and Emilia Segares Rodríguez, Deputy Secretary, pursuant to Articles 62(3) and 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the American Convention” or “the Convention”) and to Articles 29, 31, 37(6), 56 and 58 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court1 (hereinafter “the Rules of Procedure”), delivers this judgment. I INTRODUCTION OF THE CASE AND PURPOSE OF THE DISPUTE 1. On December 20, 2007, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 51 and 61 of the American Convention, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Inter-American Commission” or “the Commission”) submitted to the Court an application against the Federative Republic of Brazil (hereinafter “the State” or “Brazil”), originating from the petition presented on December 26, 2000, by the organizations: Nacional de Advogados Populares and Justiça Global on behalf of the members of the Cooperativa Agrícola de Conciliação Avante Ltda. (hereinafter “COANA”) and the Associação Comunitária de Trabalhadores Rurais (hereinafter “ADECON"). On March 2, 2006 the Commission declared the case admissible in Report No. 18/06 and on March 8, 2007, approved Report on Merits No. 14/07, in the terms of Article 50 of the Convention, with 1 As established in Article 72(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court which entered into force on March 24, 2009, “[c]ases pending resolution shall be processed according to the provisions of these Rules of Procedure, except for those cases in which a hearing has already been convened at the time of the entry into force of these Rules of Procedure; such cases shall be governed by the provisions of the previous Rules of Procedure.” Hence, the Court’s Rules of Procedure mentioned in this judgment correspond to the instrument approved by the Court at its forty-ninth session held from November 16 to 25, 2000, partially amended by the Court at its sixty-first session held from November 20 to December 4, 2003.

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