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Inter-American Court, that principle is applicable to administrative matters, in that they represent the
State’s exercise of punitive power. They add that the freedom from ex post facto laws entails not
only that actions and omissions be identified as offenses, but also that the procedure and possible
penalty be defined. Specifically, the petitioners submitted the following arguments:
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There was no action or omission that constituted an offense in law. Although it was
claimed that a transitory provision was applicable, it was in no way admissible with
respect to the justices of the Supreme Court. They note that the transitory provision
in question, No. 25 in the Constitution, spoke exclusively of public officials with
fixed terms of office.
The arguments used by some members of Congress for pursuing their termination at
the special session were alleged “acts of corruption and political clientelism.” Both
accusations entail offenses for which complaints could have been filed with the
Public Prosecution Service for regular proceedings to be pursued. The resolution
adopted by the National Congress does not, however, indicate what accusations
were made against the Supreme Court justices.
The procedure was summary in nature and did not even follow the established
format for impeachments. Thus, neither the resolution, nor the authority that
adopted it, nor the way in which it was reached were provided for in the
Constitution or in law.
17.
Regarding the right to judicial protection enshrined in Article 25 of the Convention,
the petitioners state that the amparo constitutional relief provided for in the Ecuadorian Constitution
meets the requirements of a “simple, prompt, and effective recourse” set out in that article. They
note that as the Court has ruled, such remedies must serve to protect the rights set out both in the
Convention and in states parties’ constitutions and laws. The petitioners’ arguments on Article 25
of the Convention can be summarized as follows:
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Although the amparo was applicable, a decision made by the Constitutional Court
ruled that the only permissible action against Congressional resolutions to terminate
officials in their posts was a constitutionality suit. Such suits are regulated by Article
277 of the Constitution, which sets requirements that are difficult to meet, such as
being brought by certain authorities or by one thousand members of the public. In
addition to not meeting the requirement of simplicity, such suits do not offer prompt
recourse because no specific deadlines for resolving them are established.
Regarding the effectiveness requirement, the petitioners submit that although
Ecuadorian law provides for amparo relief and, in theory, it could be filed to
challenge the effects of the Congressional resolution, to reinstate the Supreme Court
justices in their positions, and to end the violations of their rights, in practice it is not
an effective remedy. They explain that this can be seen in the denial of and
inadmissibility rulings given against the amparo relief actions presented by the judges
of the Constitutional Court, who were terminated in their duties some days earlier in
similar circumstances.
This “certainty regarding the uselessness of the remedy” is also indicated by the lack
of independence and impartiality on the part of the judges who would hear the
application. They report that at the request of President of the Republic, the
Constitutional Court ordered the amparo suits closed, and one member of Congress
threatened criminal action against the judges hearing the amparo filings lodged by
the Constitutional Court’s judges, which would point to a similar reaction were the
justices of the Supreme Court to file for the remedy. They add that in any case, the
judges of the Constitutional Court who would have heard the amparo suits on final
appeal were, on account of their appointments and commitment toward the
government, lacking in independence.