It is worth adding that the said request was only added to or complemented, without altering it, by notes from the petitioner dated June 14, and July 10 and 18, 2006, in response to a request of the Commission dated April 21, 2006, with information on judicial measures and decisions after the date of the petition and relating to the application for amparo [protection of constitutional rights] filed, to the evolution of the criminal proceedings, and to the requests concerning the detention conditions. Thus, the foregoing reveals that the petition was founded on what had happened and was happening in the criminal proceedings and that, conversely, the precautionary measures that the Commission was asked to adopt, to be decided previously, as in fact was decided, 8 concerned facts that were taking place during these proceedings, which, according to the petition, were that Mr. Díaz Peña had “health problems.” This is corroborated by the Judgment itself, which states that, in the initial petition, the petitioner “also, requested precautionary measures in favor of Mr. Díaz Peña,” which “were maintained while his detention lasted”; 9 in other words, in addition to what was requested with regard to what could be called the merits, it requested the said measures. 10 This is also supported by the subsequent observations of the petitioner that “when lodging the petition before the Commission, no judgment convicting Raúl Díaz Peña existed and that, at that time, it was a question of protecting the rights to presumption of innocence and not to suffer unlawful deprivation of liberty, to be tried in liberty, and to due process, especially as regards compliance with a reasonable time, regarding which it alleged that the violations ‘had already been committed and were gradually substantiated as the proceedings evolved.’” 11 In other words, the petition related basically and exclusively to what had happened up until October 12, 2005, in the criminal proceedings filed against Mr. Díaz Peña, considered as a unit or an indissoluble whole. This is also revealed in the circumstances that all the petitions made concerning the deprivation of liberty or preventive detention were filed before the judge before whom the said proceedings were being processed or in relation to him. 12 Additionally, the Judgment itself recognizes that the petition referred fundamentally to the criminal proceedings in question, when it states that, up until the Admissibility Report of March 20, 2009, “…it could have been considered that the matter related to a complaint of violation of due process … .” 13 Nevertheless, the Commission attributed another understanding or scope to the said petition, distinguishing three types of facts in it; some relating to the preventive detention and the length of the proceedings, others to irregularities in the criminal proceedings, and the third, to the detention conditions and the absence of medical attention. Based on this, it declared that the petition was inadmissible with regard to the second group of facts, and admissible in relation to the first and third group of facts. 14 8 Para. 94 of the Judgment. All references to paragraphs below will refer to the paragraphs of the Judgment. 9 Paras. 2(a) and 94. 10 Paras. 2(a) and 94. 11 Para. 113. 12 The fact that the precautionary measures ordered by the Commission are thus, according to Article 25(1) of its Rules of Procedure in force at the time,, “[i]n serious and urgent cases,” so that the “State concerned” adopts them “to prevent irreparable harm to persons” and, in accordance with Article 25(4) of these Rules of Procedure, the granting and adoption of them “shall not constitute a prejudgment on the merits of a case” is consistent with this observation. 13 Para. 122. 14 Para. 121. 3