briefs with observations on the petition of May 3 and August 5, 2007, indicating that the case was being heard in a criminal proceeding before a competent national court and “the existing domestic remedies ha[d] not been exhausted.” 23 Hence, the State’s observations could only refer to the facts set out in the petition and not to those that occurred subsequently; and although “the Commission indicated that after it received the initial petition it had identified” 24 the three groups of facts mentioned above, it has been verified in this case that the distinction was made on March 20, 2009; namely, when the Commission ruled on the admissibility of the said petition, 25 which occurred three years and five months after it had been presented and that, in addition, was its first decision on the petition, since it had not issued any other that were not merely formalities, made, in any case, by its Secretariat. 26 Hence, when formulating its observations and indicating that all the domestic remedies had not been exhausted in relation to the petition, the State could not have known about the division of the petition that the Commission made subsequently. The observation of the State, which the Commission considered to be a “generic” argument 27 was, consequently, consistent with what really happened, because the remedies against the ruling that ended the criminal proceedings could not have been determined or specified or, especially, filed at that point. In this regard, it is also necessary to bear in mind that the objection of failure to comply with the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is related, not to the State’s obligation to provide theoretical or hypothetical information on the national or domestic law in force concerning remedies that could be filed against a decision, but rather to demonstrating the real and effective possibility of appealing, at the appropriate time, a specific existing decision. In other words, whether, at that time and in those circumstances, the remedies against the said decision are truly available and are adequate, appropriate, and effective; and, to this end, it is evidently essential to know the exact terms of the decision, which can only occur once it has been issued. Consequently, the State could not be required to refer to the specific remedies that could be filed before the said decision had been issued, nor could it be presumed, in the event that it makes a general and, therefore, theoretical reference to them, that they do not exist. It is therefore evident that, since at the date of the petition (October 12, 2005), and at the date of the State’s observation on this (in 2007), no judgment had been delivered in the criminal proceedings, it was impossible, in this case, to require the State to comply with the jurisprudential requirements of indicating precisely or in detail, the remedies that could be filed against a ruling that was only delivered, convicting the victim, on April 29, 2008. 28 And this is why, also, that the Judgment records that “[o]n November 12, 2009, in the brief with observations submitted in the proceedings on the merits of the case before the Commission and after admissibility report No. 23/09 of March 20, 2009, the State referred to the existence of the ordinary remedy of appeal, the appeal for review, and the constitutional review, as well as the possibilities of protecting Mr. Díaz Peña’s rights 23 Para. 118, and also in the brief of August 8, 2007, presented in relation to the precautionary measures ordered. 24 Para. 112. 25 Paras. 39 and 122. 26 Art. 29(1) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure: “Initial Processing: The Commission, acting initially through the Executive Secretariat, shall receive and carry out the initial processing of the petitions presented, …”. 27 Para. 111. Nevertheless, it did not proceed in the same way with regard to the petitioner’s request that Article 46(2) of the Convention be applied to the petition, because it did not rule in this regard (para. 119(a)). 28 Para. 87. 6