SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC EMILIO CAMACHO PAREDES RICARDO CANESE V. PARAGUAY I share the conclusions of this judgment, and consequently support it. However, the issues raised and the responsibilities determined have prompted some reflections that I feel obliged to set forth in this opinion. 1. Filing a criminal prosecution does not entail criminal conduct, because injuria and slander are classified in the penal legislation (Arts. 150 and 151, Act 1160) and (370-slander- and- 372–injuria- of the former Penal Code); in other words, the proceeding was initiated on the basis of legal provisions that were in force at the time, and are still in force in the current penal legislation. Consequently, the Paraguayan State cannot be blamed automatically for having initiated criminal proceedings. The initiation and the proceedings of the case must be examined carefully, as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has done, together with the conduct of the judges who allowed serious procedural irregularities to be committed that affected the fundamental rights of the appellant, and which, in this specific case, show that an external determination could prevail over the proper administration of justice. 2. Personal freedom and, particularly, freedom of movement (Art. 41 of the Constitution) and Article 22 of the Convention were seriously restricted by preventing him [Ricardo Canese] from leaving the country, despite the permission he requested repeatedly. The attitude of the judicial agents who repeatedly denied him permission to leave the country was illegal and unconstitutional, openly arbitrary and unjustifiable, in the case of a person who had convincingly demonstrated his domicile in the country, and that he was airing a matter of public interest. Moreover, the case related to a candidate to the presidency of the country, a municipal councilor, exercising his profession and with all his family residing in the country. The judge of first instance did not allow the case to be opened to evidence! The judge did not allow the proposed witnesses to testify. Furthermore, the complainants were not cited and, even so, the proceeding went forward. 3. The following are the most relevant judicial decisions for an adequate understanding of the case: In final judgment No. 17 of March 22, 1994, the judge of first instance condemned him [Canese] to four months’ imprisonment and a fine of 14.950.000 Gs.; in decision and judgment No. 18 of November 4, 1997, the Third Chamber of the Court of Criminal Appeal modified the sentence and condemned him to two months’ imprisonment and a fine of 2.969.000 Gs. for slander, absolving him of injuria.In decision and judgment No. 179-May 2, 2001- the Supreme Court of Justice, confirmed the conviction imposed by the Court of Appeal.In decision and judgment No. 1362 of December 11, 2002, the Supreme Court of Justice. Admitted the appeal for review and annulled judicial decisions: S.D: 17-22-III-94 of the First Criminal Court of First