41 162. The Commission considers that the grounds stated in both decisions were based solely on a qualitative analysis of the law applicable to the matter heard by both judicial bodies, without getting into a substantive analysis of the central purpose of the action brought by the alleged victim claiming protection for his constitutional rights. In particular, the IACHR is of the view that the decision to protect should respond to the position on the compatibility of the sanction provided for in the Rules of Military Discipline and the legal order in force. The formulation of the specific reasons and grounds on this aspect was a requirement provided for by the domestic legal order itself, in keeping with Articles 273 and 274 of the National Constitution, and in light of Article 23 of the same Constitution. 163. The Commission also observes that in the amparo action decided upon in first and second instance by the Sixth Court for Civil Matters and the Constitutional Court, respectively, one of the main arguments raised by Mr. Flor was that the decisions adopted as of the summary information proceeding were based on the application of a discriminatory provision that punished conduct that had been derogated from the criminal legislation, namely, consensual relations between persons of the same sex. Mr. Flor also proposed that in the course of that proceeding a series of irregularities had been committed related to due process guarantees. The IACHR also notes that in processing the amparo in the first instance Mr. Flor asked the Sixth Court for Civil Matters, on several occasions, to order the respective military authority to forward a copy of the record in the summary information proceeding. As established in the section on facts proven, that request was denied, indicating that Mr. Flor had the right to file the documentation he considered relevant to that judicial authority. 164. In that regard, the IACHR observes in particular that while the argument on alleged discrimination was before the Constitutional Court, it did not analyze it, and determined that the sanction imposed for misconduct was in order. The Constitutional Court did not state reasons for determining whether the conduct sanctioned did or did not fit within a criminal statute that by then had been derogated, and if appropriate analyze the legal consequences of that determination. The IACHR reiterates once again the considerations made in previous sections on the discriminatory treatment to which Mr. Flor was subjected in determining his labor situation in the Ecuadorian Army. 165. In this respect, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established: "A remedy which proves illusory because of the general conditions prevailing in the country, or even in the particular circumstances of a given case, cannot be considered effective."149 The IACHR considers that the failure to state the reasoning in the decisions on the action for protection filed by Mr. Homero Flor kept him from having effective access to judicial protection that would protect the rights affected by the action of the military authorities aimed at punishing the alleged victim’s perceived sexual orientation. Consequently, the standards applied domestically to resolve the amparo action filed by the respective judicial authorities were incompatible with Article 8(1) of the American Convention, and therefore constitute a violation of his right to access justice. 166. Based on the considerations set forth in this section, the Commission concludes that the Ecuadorian State violated, to the detriment of Homero Flor, the rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection enshrined in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the American Convention, in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the same instrument. 149 I/A Court H.R. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Articles 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A. No. 9, para. 24.