74 Arguments of the representatives 189. The representatives requested moral damages in the following terms: a) given the grave circumstances and violations of basic human rights in this case, “both those before the Court and the underlying violations,” and the ongoing indifference of the State to such violations and the consequential extreme suffering of the victims, moral damages over and above a judgment of condemnation should be awarded; b) the aggravated circumstances of the case that should be taken into account include: gross violations of the right to life as part of a pattern of systematic, collective reprisals against civilian maroons; intentional destruction of the remains of a number of the victims of the massacre and denial of the fundamental right to conduct the required burials; ongoing dispossession of traditional lands and resources; the State’s gross indifference and hostility towards the suffering of the victims; Suriname’s affirmative obstruction of justice; and the complete failure over an 18-year period to investigate the massacre, punish those responsible and compensate the victims; c) the victims have suffered and still suffer greatly because of their inability to comply with fundamental cultural norms, and because “angry spirits are avenging themselves on the victims and causing them physical and mental afflictions”; d) the victims have been forced “to take up life in a foreign country far from the context in which [their lives] had been evolving, in a state of solitude, poverty, and severe physical and psychological distress”; and e) the massacre is not history for the victims, it is a burden that each and every one of them has endured for the past 18 years, made more heavy and painful by the State’s indifference to their suffering. Arguments of the State 190. The State’s arguments found in the material damages section (supra paragraph 184) apply to the matter of moral damages as well. The Court’s Assessment 191. Moral damage may include suffering and affliction, detriment to very significant personal values, as well as non-pecuniary alterations to a victim’s living conditions. Since it is not possible to assign a precise monetary equivalent to nonpecuniary damage, for purposes of comprehensive reparation to victims, the Court must turn to other alternatives: first, payment of an amount of money or delivery of goods or services that can be estimated in monetary terms, which the Court will establish through reasonable application of judicial discretion and equity; and second, public acts or works that seek, inter alia, to commemorate and dignify victims, as well as to avoid the repetition of human rights violations.104 104 Cf. Case of the Serrano-Cruz Sisters, supra note 9, para. 156; Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre. Reparations, supra note 82, para. 80; and Case of De la Cruz-Flores, supra note 59, para. 155.