particular, the decisions in the case of the “fourteenth salary” and the case of the “D’Hondt method.” This is illustrated by one of the motions of censure that requested impeachment supposedly because, in the decision on the “D’Hondt method,” there had been a presumed: Personal interest and to benefit those who had enabled their election to the Constitutional Tribunal […] prejudicing and placing at a disadvantage all the other political parties that exist in the country [and …] ignoring the formula for calculating proportional representation that permitted plural and democratic political representation [… based on which] they have jeopardized the next elections, with this dangerous attack on the democratic life of the country, as well as on the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution.124 95. As the Judgment notes,125 Ecuadorian law was sufficiently clear in the sense that the opinions given in the judgments delivered by the judges could not be grounds for their removal. The congressional records for December 1 and 8, 2004, allow it to be concluded that there was no mention of specific facts related to the supposed “serious offenses” committed by the judges; rather, reference was only made to their decisions, which were based on legal grounds and delivered within the framework of their competence. 96. Based on the above-mentioned reasons, legal grounds and factual evidence, it can be clearly understood that, in the Judgment, the Inter-American Court declared the respondent State internationally responsible for the violation of different rights established in Article 8(1) and (2), as well as in Article 8(4) (ne bis in idem),126 in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention; and even, of Article 8(1) on relation to Article 23(1)(c) and Article 1(1) of the Pact of San José, owing to the arbitrary termination of the permanence in the exercise of judicial functions, and the consequent infringement of judicial independence and the guarantee of impartiality. The Court also declared the State’s international responsibility for the violation of Article 25(1), in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, because the victims were prevented from filing the “remedy of amparo,” owing to the decision issued by the new Constitutional Tribunal. VIII. THE FAILURE TO MAKE A SPECIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHTS ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE 8(2) OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION CITED BY THE COMMISSION AND ALLEGED BY THE PARTIES 97. The ICourtHR failed to make a detailed examination of different judicial guarantees cited by the Inter-American Commission and alleged by the victims established in Article 8(2), considered that “[h]aving determined that the organ that carried out the termination was not competent, it is not necessary to analyze the other guarantees established in Article 8(1) of the Convention, because this determination signifies that the decision adopted by Congress was totally unacceptable.”127 98. I consider that the Inter-American Court could have analyzed the specific violations of other rights established in Article 8(2) of the American Convention, because the National 124 Cf. National Congress record, 24-326, session of December 1, 2004. 125 Para. 208 of the Judgment. 126 The ICourtHR found that Article 8(4) of the Pact of San José had been violated, considering that, pursuant to domestic law, the impeachment proceedings held against the judges had concluded on December 1, 2004, and according to the explicit certification issued by the Secretariat of Congress that the motions of censured had been rejected because they had not obtained sufficient votes; because the “re-opening of the vote signified a new proceeding” in the session of Congress on December 8 that year. See, especially, paragraphs 184 to 186 of the Judgment. 127 Para. 223 of the Judgment. 26