27 102. Second, the Commission reiterates that under international standards on judicial independence, removal of judges is acceptable only when they complete their term or condition of appointment, or when they commit disciplinary breaches. International law and state obligations in the area of judicial independence accordingly require the States to ensure the guarantees of due process in all procedures that may result in the removal of a judge from his or her position. These standards come from international law and are aimed at protecting the judicial function. Therefore, they apply independent of the name given to each separation or termination under domestic law, be it cese, destitución, or remoción. What is relevant is that the free removal of judges is prohibited, and therefore they are the beneficiaries of the guarantees of freedom from ex post facto laws and due process provided for in Articles 8(1), 8(2), and 9 of the American Convention. 80 2. Analysis whether the State incurred in a violation of the rights established in Article 9 of the Convention 103. For the purposes of an adequate analysis, the Commission considers it pertinent to distinguish between the termination resolution of November 25 and the impeachment conducted on December 1, the vote on which was repeated on December 8. First, as regards the removal of the judges of the Constitutional Court on November 25, 2004, the Commission already concluded that as of the date of their appointment (March 2003) and termination (November 25, 2004), the Constitution and the legislation expressly established that their term would be for four years, and the only means provided for in the Constitution to remove them was by impeachment. Nonetheless, in a heated political context of tension among the different branches of government, the Congress created an ad hoc mechanism not provided for in the Constitution or in statute to proceed to terminate all the judges of the Constitutional Court under the argument that they had been elected illegally in 2003 and that it was necessary to correct that illegality. 104. The Commission has already held that if the judge must be removed, said removal must be carried out in strict conformity with the procedures established in the Constitution as a safeguard of the democratic system of government and the rule of law. The principle is based on the special nature of the function of the courts and guarantees the independence of judges vis-à-vis all other branches of government and in the face of political-electoral changes. 81 In particular, regarding the processes of correcting situations of corruption and inefficiency, the Commission has said that they should be conducted with full respect for basic due process standards and full independence of the different branches of government. 82 105. As regards the impeachment conducted on December 1 and whose vote was repeated on December 8, 2004, the domestic law expressly prohibits the impeachment of the judges who sit on the Constitutional Court based on their judgments and the opinions they express, and establishes that they may be impeached for committing “constitutional or statutory infractions” (Article 130(9)(3) of the National Constitution) or “acts or omissions in discharging their duties and characterized as infractions” (Article 87 of the Organic Law on the Legislative Function). 106. The Commission considers that this formulation of the grounds for removal does not offer sufficient standards of determination, and that with a view to safeguarding the principle of judicial independence these grounds must be described with the greatest possible clarity. In this 80 See I/A Court H.R., Case of the Constitutional Tribunal v. Peru, Judgment of January 31, 2001, Series C No. 71, para. 74; and I/A Court H.R., Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of August 5, 2008, Series C No. 182, para. 44: “… [T]he authority in charge of the procedure to remove a judge must behave impartially and allow the judge to exercise the right of defense.” 81 IACHR, Report No. 30/97, Case 10,087, Merits, Gustavo Carranza, Argentina, September 30, 1997, paras. 41, 58. IACHR, Report No. 48/00, Case 11,166, Merits, Walter Humberto Vásquez Vejarano, Peru, April 13, 2000, para. 76. 82 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, 1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, Doc. 31, March 12, 1993, paras. 61 and 62.