29 112. Regarding the guarantees of independence and impartiality, the Court has ruled that although they are related, it is also true that they each have a legal content of their own. 85 As the Court has said: One of the principal purposes of the separation of public powers is to guarantee the independence of judges.[…] Said autonomous exercise shall be guaranteed by the State both in its institutional aspect, that is, with regard to the Judicial Power as a system, as well as in connection with its individual aspect, that is, with regard to the specific judge as an individual. The objective of the protection lies in avoiding that the justice system in general and its members specifically be submitted to possible improper restrictions in the exercise of their duties by bodies foreign to the Judicial Power or even by those judges that exercise duties of revision or appeal.[…] On the other hand, impartiality demands that the judge acting in a specific dispute approach the facts of the case subjectively free of all prejudice and also offer sufficient objective guarantees to exclude any doubt the parties or the community might entertain as to his or her lack of impartiality.[…] The European Court of Human Rights has explained that personal or subjective impartiality is to be presumed unless there is evidence to the contrary.[…] Thus, the objective test entails determining whether the judge in question provided convincing elements to eliminate legitimate or grounded fears regarding his or her impartiality.[…] That is so since the judge must appear as to act without being subject to any influence, inducement, pressure, threat, or interference, be it direct or indirect,[…] and only and exclusively in accordance with – and on the basis of – the law. 86 113. While the oversight powers of the National Congress, through the mechanism of an impeachment proceeding, are not per se incompatible with the American Convention, such powers must be exercised in such a manner that ensures the observance of due process guarantees, especially in the case of the removal of judges. 114. As regards the guarantee of impartiality, the Commission considers that in the instant case, both in relation to the termination resolution and in relation to the impeachment proceeding, a series of elements come together that affected the impartiality of the National Congress. In this regard, the Commission notes that according to transcripts of the legislative debates, the termination of the judges, in addition to constituting an ad hoc mechanism for the removal of judges, was not motivated by an assessment of the conduct, suitability, or performance of the judges, or an analysis of the alleged breaches committed by the judges in the performance of their functions, but responded to the different political majorities attained at different moments in the Congress. In addition, a reading of the legislative debates reveals the scant importance accorded to respecting the formal procedures for the removal of judges, as well as the partiality and political purpose motivating the legislators’ action. 85 I/A Court H.R., Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of August 5, 2008, Series C No. 182, para. 55, quoting the following: “For example, the Committee against Torture noted: ‘The Committee is concerned at the judiciary’s de facto dependence on the executive, which poses a major obstacle to the immediate institution of an impartial inquiry when there are substantial grounds for believing that an act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.’” United Nations, Committee against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations: United Nations, Committee against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations: Burundi, CAT/C/BDI/CO/1, para. 12. 86 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Constitutional Tribunal v. Peru, Judgment of January 31, 2001, Series C No. 71, para. 73; I/A Court H.R., Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, paras. 55 and 56, citing Eur. Court HR. Pullar v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, § 30, and Fey v. Austria, judgment of 24 February 1993, Series A no. 255-A p. 8, § 28, citing Eur. Court HR. Daktaras v. Lithuania, no. 42095/98 (Sect. 3) (bil.), ECHR 2000-X – (10.10.00), § 30, citing Eur. Court HR. Piersack v. Belgium, judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A no. 53, and De Cubber v. Belgium, judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86. Principle 2 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.

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