6 - - convened to and notified of the impeachment proceeding after having been removed. The Constitution does not provide for conducting an impeachment proceeding subsequent to the termination of the judges. The members of the Constitutional Court were terminated because it was noted that there was an “illegality in the appointment,” but they were subjected to an impeachment proceeding because of their participation in two resolutions of this Court, which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The second vote, on December 8, 2004, constituted a mere vote, and not an impeachment trial. The second impeachment trial was not provided for in the Constitution, and therefore could not “legalize” the sanction imposed on November 25. 26. Regarding the right to judicial protection enshrined in Article 25 of the Convention, the petitioners state that the amparo constitutional relief provided for in the Ecuadorian Constitution meets the requirements of a “simple, prompt, and effective recourse” set out in that article. They note that as the Court has ruled, such remedies must serve to protect the rights set out both in the Convention and in states parties’ constitutions and laws. The petitioners’ arguments on Article 25 of the Convention can be summarized as follows: - - - - Even though the amparo action was in order, the de facto Constitutional Court, heeding the presidential petition and violating the procedure, established by a decision that the only action that could be brought against resolutions of termination (las resoluciones de cese) issued by the National Congress was the action challenging constitutionality. That action is regulated at Article 277 of the Constitution and imposes requirements difficult to meet such as the initiative of certain authorities or of one thousand citizens. In addition to not meeting the requirement of simplicity, such an action is not swift since it does not have defined time periods for resolution, it is not adequate because it is not designed to protect human rights but to challenge acts that generally attack the Constitution, nor is it effective because it does not make reparation for human rights violations. In any event, if the action challenging constitutionality had been adequate, the motion was going to be heard by the Constitutional Court, which was not independent or impartial, and which, moreover, had already advanced its opinion on the issue. As for the requirement of effectiveness, the petitioners indicated that the Constitutional Court ruled that it was out of order to request amparos against the resolutions of Congress, even the resolution that terminated the members of the Constitutional Court, which is why the judges of first instance refused to hear the amparo cases that were filed. In addition, they stated that it didn’t make sense to appeal the denials of the amparo actions before the Constitutional Court, which was the organ that asked the judges to disqualify themselves from hearing the cases, and because if the Constitutional Court were to rule favorably on the amparos sought, “it would mean that they are removing themselves from their positions.” In addition, the petitioners argued that the judges in the amparo actions suffered from arbitrary meddling that impaired their independence and impartiality, through the resolution issued by the Constitutional Court to impede the processing of the amparo actions, and the threats with sanctions imposed on judges who processed those requests for amparo judgments handed down by members of the de facto Constitutional Court and by legislators. In addition, the judges elected on November 25, 2004, lacked independence due to their commitment to the majority that elected them. The contentious-administrative jurisdiction did not constitute an adequate or effective remedy insofar as, in the last resort, the motion would be ruled on by a