challenging the constitutionality of that decision, which the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay rejected in limine on September 18, 2006. 6. The petitioner maintains that M.R.G.A fled with the child, failing to comply with the order for his return. It alleges that no Paraguayan authority enforced the judicial order. It gives account of different steps taken to locate D, in both Paraguay and Argentina, which led to the issuing in the latter country of an international warrant for the arrest of the child’s mother. It adds that in January 2008, Argentina requested M.R.G.A.’s extradition and in April 2008, the Criminal Judge of the First Court of Guarantees of Paraguay issued a warrant for her arrest for failure to appear at the hearing for return [of the child]. 7. The petitioner maintains that despite the outstanding arrest warrant and the various opportunities to arrest Mrs. M.R.G.A, for ten years, the Paraguayan authorities did not take steps to locate the child and that the raids ordered were of dubious efficacy. It argues that the State never determined whether D. had been treated in any hospital or other care facility with a view to finding him and ascertaining his health status. 8. The petitioner indicates that in 2015, INTERPOL located D. and Mrs. M.R.G.A., who was placed in pretrial detention. That same day, the child was placed in the temporary custody of his maternal aunt, and the precautionary measure was ordered for the progressive restoration of ties between D. and Mr. Córdoba, for the purpose of fulfillment of the return order. It alleges that the measure for progressive restoration of ties has been ineffective since Mr. Córdoba lives in Argentina. Therefore, the few occasions for them to meet without the judge having set specific times, involved time and money which, in his capacity as a worker, required major effort on his part. He adds that these meetings took place in the presence of third parties, which prevented him from creating an atmosphere of trust and intimacy. It alleges that, once the child was found, the lack of interaction has resulted in a failure to implement his return. 9. The petitioner mentions that the Argentine Embassy made its premises available to provide accommodation for the child, and his father and paternal grandmother, and offered an opportunity for professionals designated by Paraguayan authorities to visit the child D on a daily basis and provide psychological and emotional support. He indicates also that the Argentine Court of Guarantees urged the First Duty FirstInstance Juvenile Court of Paraguay to return the child D., sending a “repetition” of its request. 10. The petitioner maintains that on February 4, 2016, the Office of the Public Defender for Children of Paraguay requested different measures from the lower court judge prior to returning D., such as a guaranteed residence in Argentina for a minimum of six months, enrolment in the educational institution where the child would continue his studies, and medical insurance for the child, among other things. It maintains that although these steps were taken, the judge did not order enforcement of her judgment for the return of the child. 11. It indicates that on March 31, 2017, the Third Caacupé Court ordered as a new precautionary measure that the child D remain in Paraguay, contravening not only the international norms but also its own return order. The petitioner maintains that that order was issued based on a psychological report issued by a medical board that blocked, without argument, participation by the Argentine professional proposed by the National Secretary for Children and Adolescents at the request of the Argentine Consulate. Therefore, it brought an action to declare the precautionary measure unconstitutional, which was denied by the Supreme Court of Justice. 12. The petitioner maintains that Mr. Córdoba has had various difficulties in relating to his son, citing as an example that he invariably calls child D by phone once a week, and that the child’s guardians do not bring him to the phone. It alleges that as a result, he requested the IACHR to issue a precautionary measure. 13. It alleges that the object of the Hague Convention, like other conventions in this area, is to restore the situation prior to the wrongful removal, and the consequent return of the child to his habitual environment for resolution of issues related to custody, visits, and others. It maintains that the judge in this case has not complied with the international guidelines since, following the child’s appearance, she not only extended D’s stay in Paraguay, but also ordered him to remain in that country. It adds that Argentina and Paraguay have ratified the 1984 [sic] Inter-American Convention on International Traffic in Minors, which expressly prohibits deciding on the merits of custody claims, giving precedence to the duty of return. It maintains that the actions of the judiciary