40 will be classified as terrorist crimes, that authority must be exercised in accordance with the principle of legality and bearing in mind international consensus with respect to certain elements of terrorism that trigger a punitive response on the part of the State. 131. In the Commission’s Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, after reviewing the relevant sources, the Commission concluded that the authorities on the subject “suggest that characteristics common to incidents of terrorism may be described in terms of: (a) the nature and identity of the perpetrators of terrorism; (b) the nature and identity of the victims of terrorism; (c) the objectives of 160 terrorism; and (d) the means employed to perpetrate terrorist violence.” Observance of the principle of legality under Article 9 of the Convention, in the terms described above, means that when describing terrorist behaviors, these elements must be more clearly defined, thereby avoiding any vague or ambiguous language that lends itself to varied interpretations as to what the criminalized behaviors are or their similarity to other crimes. 132. The organs of the inter-American system have had occasion to evaluate the way in which terrorist behaviors have been defined in various countries. In effect, “[t]he Commission and the Court have previously found certain domestic anti-terrorism laws to violate the principle of legality because, for example, those laws have attempted to prescribe a comprehensive definition of terrorism that is invariably too broad and imprecise, or have legislated variations on the crime of “treason” that denaturalizes the meaning of that offense and creates 161 imprecision and ambiguities in distinguishing between these various offenses. ” 133. When examining the definitions of terrorist offenses in specific cases, the Commission has concluded that the principle of legality is violated when the domestic law uses definitions of crime that are open-ended, abstract or vague, and thus contrary to the modern principles of criminal law which require specific terminology with little or no room for interpretation, especially when the definitions of terrorist offenses can be confused either with the descriptions of other terrorist offenses or with other crimes, thus allowing for broad interpretation and obstructing the necessary legal certainty that the State 162 must guarantee in this area. 134. Other international human rights bodies have addressed the issue of broad definitions of terrorist offenses in domestic laws, underscoring the effect that such broad definitions can have on the effective observance of human rights. In the case of a number of States, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has observed that the definition of terrorist crimes in their domestic laws is too broad, and can thus lead to violations of the human rights protected under the International Covenant on Civil 163 and Political Rights. It made comments of this nature in regard to the domestic laws of Egypt, 164 165 Estonia and New Zealand. responses to such violence. To the contrary, it is possible to identify several characteristics frequently associated with incidents of terrorism that provide sufficient parameters within which states’ pertinent international legal obligations in responding to this violence can be identified and evaluated. These characteristics relate to the nature and identity of the perpetrators of terrorism, the nature and identity of the victims of terrorism, the objectives of terrorism, and the means employed to perpetrate terrorist violence. In particular, the Commission has noted that terrorism may be perpetrated, individually or collectively, by a variety of actors, including private persons or groups as well as governments, may employ varying means and levels of violence ranging from mere threats devised to induce public panic to weapons of mass destruction, and may impact detrimentally upon a variety of persons who are afforded particular protections under international law, including women, children and refugees.” IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, Executive Summary, paragraph 7. 160 IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, paragraph 17. 161 IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, paragraph 226. 162 IACHR, Application filed with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Castillo Petruzzi et al v. Peru, referenced in I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al., Judgment of May 30, 1999 (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C No. 52, paragraph 114. IACHR, Application filed with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, referenced in I/A Court H.R., Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, Judgment of November 18, 2004 (Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C. No. 115, paragraph 74. 163 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Egypt, CCPR/CO/79/Add. 23 (August 9, 1993), paragraph 8 (“The Committee is particularly disturbed by the adoption in 1992 of law No. 97 on terrorism, which contains provisions contrary to articles 6 and 15 of the Covenant. The definition of terrorism contained in that law is so broad that it encompasses a wide range of