45 for presuming that a crime was committed to achieve a terrorist end. In effect, under Article 1 of the Law 18,314: “Article 1. The offenses listed in Article 2 constitute terrorist offenses when any of the following circumstances apply: 1. The offense is committed with the intention of instilling in the population or in a portion thereof a well-founded fear of becoming victim to similar crimes, either due to the nature and effect of the methods used or evidence suggesting that it is part of a premeditated plan to attack a specific category or group of people. The intent of instilling fear among the general population shall be presumed, unless there is indication to the contrary, when the offense was committed by means of explosive or incendiary devices, weapons with great destructive power, toxic, corrosive or infectious agents, or other agents that could cause great havoc, or by mailing letters, packages or the like with explosive or toxic effects. 2. The offense is committed for the purpose of pressuring authorities to make certain decisions or imposing demands. 151. Once the amendment was introduced, the definition of terrorist crimes was as follows: “Article 1.- The offenses listed in Article 2 constitute terrorist offenses when the offense is committed with the intention of instilling in the population or in a portion thereof a well-founded fear of becoming victim to similar crimes, either due to the nature and effect of the methods used or evidence suggesting that it is part of a premeditated plan to attack a specific category or group of people, either in order to undo or thwart decisions by the authorities or to impose demands upon them.” 152. Thus, the new legal definition of terrorism preserves the precise terminology of the previous definition. The only change is in the structure of the provision, since subparagraph 2 of the previous Article 1 -one of the subjective elements in the legal description of terrorism- becomes one of the factors that would allow one to infer a terrorist intent in some of the crimes criminalized under the regular criminal law system; the verb “to thwart” was added; also, the presumption of terrorist intent based on the use of certain methods was eliminated. The elimination of this presumption of a terrorist intent notwithstanding, because the wording of the description of this criminal offense has not substantially altered, the Commission observes that the law is still flawed by overly broad, vague, imprecise language that fails to distinguish the offenses criminalized in Law 18,314 from other criminal offenses and that led the Commission to conclude that the formulation of the offenses criminalized in Law 18,314 was contrary to the principle of legality. 153. Similarly, the description of the crimes of attempting or threatening to commit terrorist offenses relies on the definition of those offenses contained in Article 1 and is thus flawed by the very same problems of vague, overly-broad and imprecise language that are at the crux of the Commission’s conclusions in this report. 154. Summarizing, the IACHR concludes that while the Chilean Congress has passed a new law, the legislative amendments have not thus far meant a substantive change in the description of the terrorist behavior that would make the law compatible with the principle of legality recognized in Article 9 of the American Convention. B. 155. The convictions in light to the right to equal protection and non-discrimination Article 24 of the American Convention provides that: All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law. 156. Article 1(1) of the Convention provides that: