37 135 indiscriminately as either one crime or the other.” The Court placed particular emphasis on the problems that this type of ambiguities cause, as their effect may be to restrict due process guarantees, depending on which category of crime is charged; the effect may also be to change the penalty 136 imposed. The Court also wrote that in such situations, the accused has no way of knowing to a certainty what the criminalized behavior in each category is, the elements used in its commission, the 137 objects or assets against which it is directed, and the impact it has on the whole of society. 122. The Inter-American Court has also had occasion to assess the precision with which crimes are described, irrespective of their connection to other crimes. Thus, for example, in the case of the crime of slander in Chile and Venezuela, the Court held that it incorporates a ” description that is vague and ambiguous and it does not specify clearly the typical forum for a criminal behavior, which could lead to broad interpretations, allowing the determined behaviors to be penalized incorrectly by using the 138 criminal codification.” In the case of Usón Ramírez specifically, the Court made reference to the lack of specificity as to the injury that must be present for the conduct to qualify as slander. In the Court’s words, “[S]ince it does not specify the injury required, such law allows that the subjectivity of the offended party determine the existence of crime, even when the active subject did not have the intent to injure, offend, 139 or disparage the passive subject.” 123. The Court has also addressed the imprecision in the definitions of certain types of crime, 140 which include broad modalities of participation that de-characterize the respective crime 2. Important considerations with respect to terrorism under international law and its relationship to the principle of legality 124. Terrorism in all its forms is a serious crime under international law that involves a profound and extreme violation of human rights and poses a threat to democracy, peace and regional 141 and international security. It is also a serious and meaningful threat to democratic governments and 142 143 the institutions of democratic government. It is a particularly cruel and abominable form of violence 135 Referring to articles 1, 2 and 3 of Decree Law No. 25.659 and articles 2 and 3 of Decree Law No. 25,475, which criminalized treason and terrorism, respectively, in Peru, but made it impossible to distinguish when a person was committing one crime as opposed to the other. See, I/A Court H.R., Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, paragraph 153; I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, paragraph119. 136 I/A Court H.R., Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, paragraph119; and I/A Court H.R., Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, paragraph 119. 137 I/A Court H.R., Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, paragraph 117. 138 I/A Court H.R., Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, paragraph 56; and I/A Court H.R., Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, paragraph 92. 139 I/A Court H.R., Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, paragraph 56. 140 Referring to Article 2 of Decree Law No. 25.475, which criminalizes treason in Peru. Although the provision contemplated an active perpetrator, it also included broad methods of participation in the commission of the offense, such as “providing support,” thereby altering the very definition of the perpetrator, without ever clearly defining what the specific criminalized behaviors were. See. I/A Court H.R., Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, paragraph 155; and I/A Court H.R., Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, paragraphs 117 and 118. 141 IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, Executive Summary, paragraph 1. 142 IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, paragraphs 2, 3. 143 IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1, corr., October 22, 2002, paragraph 226, and Executive Summary, paragraph 17.