8 At the public hearing, the Delegate claimed that the moral damages should not be linked to actual damages. He maintained that moral damages “to a victim cannot be a direct function of the victim's social status or economic situation.” 32. In its brief of January 2, 1996 the State, for its part, cited this Court and the European Court of Human Rights, to the effect that “the Tribunal's very recognition that a right has been violated normally constitutes just reparation for the damage inflicted”; all the more so in the instant case, inasmuch as the State itself has unilaterally recognized its responsibility. The State deemed the compensatory award for moral damages sought by the Commission to be “excessive and quite disproportionate to the material damages and the general conditions of the instant case and the victims.” 33. The Court observes that while the Commission did rely for its calculation of moral damages on the Court’s opinions in the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases in Judgments of July 21, 1989, it is also a fact that different awards were made in the Judgment on reparations in the Aloeboetoe et al. case (US$29,070.00 for each of six families and US$38,155.00 for the seventh, in addition to other obligations to be discharged by the State). 34. The Court is of the opinion that, while case law may establish precedents, it cannot be invoked as a criterion to be universally applied; instead, each case needs to be examined individually. It should also be noted that in the present case, as in that of Aloeboetoe et al., and unlike the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases, the State has acknowledged the facts and accepted responsibility. 35. This having been said, there are numerous cases in which other international tribunals have decided that a condemnatory judgment per se constitutes adequate reparation for moral damages, as amply demonstrated by the case law of, among others, the European Court of Human Rights (arrêt Kruslin du 24 avril 1990, série A No. 176-A p. 24 par. 39; arrêt McCallum du 30 août 1990, série A No. 183, p. 27 par. 37; arrêt Wassink du 27 septembre 1990, série A No. 185-A, p. 15 par. 41; arrêt Koendjbiharie du 25 octobre 1990, série A No. 185-B, p.42 par. 35; arrêt Darby du 23 octobre 1990, série A No. 187, p. 14 par. 40; arrêt Lala c. Pays-Bas du 22 septembre 1994, série A No. 297-A p. 15 par. 38; arrêt Pelladoah c. Pays-Bas du 22 septembre 1994, série A No. 297-B p. 36, par. 44; arrêt Kroon et al. c. Pays-Bas du 27 octobre 1994, série A No. 297-C p. 59 par. 45; arrêt Boner c. Royaume-Uni du 28 octobre 1994, série A No. 300-B, p. 76, par. 46; arrêt Ruiz Torija c. Espagne du 9 décembre 1994, série A No. 303-A, p. 13, par. 33; arrêt B. contre Autriche du 28 mars 1990, série A No. 175, p. 20, par. 59). However, it is the view of this Court that while a condemnatory judgment may in itself constitute a form of reparation and moral satisfaction, whether or not there has been recognition on the part of the State, it would not suffice in the instant case, given the extreme gravity of the violation of the right to life and of the moral suffering inflicted on the victims and their next of kin, who should be compensated on an equitable basis. 36. As this Court has held in the past, [i]t is clear that the victims suffered moral damages, for it is characteristic of human nature that anybody subjected to the aggression and abuse described above will experience moral suffering. The Court considers that no evidence is required to arrive at this conclusion. (Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, supra 14, para. 52).