22 At these proceedings, the Commission has only presented the 1762 treaty. The Court has already expressed its opinion of this so-called international treaty (cf. supra, para. 57). No other provision of domestic law, either written or customary, has been relied upon to establish the autonomy of the Saramakas. The Court believes that the racial motive put forward by the Commission has not been duly proved and finds the argument of the unique social structure of the Saramaka tribe to be without merit. The assumption that a domestic rule on territorial jurisdiction was transgressed in order to violate the right to life does not of itself establish the right to moral damages claimed on behalf of the tribe. The Saramakas could raise this alleged breach of public domestic law before the competent jurisdiction; however, they may not present it as a factor that justifies the payment of moral damages to the whole tribe. XIV 85. In its judgments of July 21, 1989, in the Velásquez Rodríguez and Godínez Cruz cases, the Court presented its criteria regarding the calculation of the amounts payable in compensation (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages, supra 28, para. 40 et seq.; and, Godínez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages, supra 27, para. 38 et seq.). In those decisions, the Court held that when the victim has died and the beneficiaries of the compensation are his heirs, the family members have a current or future possibility of working or receiving income on their own. The children, who should be guaranteed an education until they reach a certain age, will be able to work thereafter. In the Court’s opinion, “[i]t is not correct, then, in these cases, to adhere to rigid criteria [. . .] but rather to arrive at a prudent estimate of the damages, given the circumstances of each case” (ibid., para. 48; ibid., para. 46). 86. As for the assessment of compensation for moral damages, the Court, in its judgments of July 21, 1989, stated that “indemnification must be based upon the principles of equity ” (ibid., para. 27; ibid., para. 25). 87. In the instant case, the Court has followed the aforementioned precedents. In the matter of compensation for loss of earnings, it has arrived at “a prudent estimate of the damages.” As for the moral damages, the Court based these on “principles of equity.” The phrases “prudent estimate of the damages” and “principles of equity” do not mean that the Court has discretion in setting the amounts of compensation. On this issue, the Court has strictly adhered to the methods ordinarily used in the case law and has acted in prudent and reasonable fashion by ordering in situ verification by its Deputy Secretary of the figures that served as the basis for its calculations. 88. In order to arrive at the amount of reparations for actual damages to be received by the victims’ successors, the method employed was to relate it to the income that the victims would have earned throughout their working life had they