11 31. It is my understanding that this new development cannot and must not be ignored or minimized by contemporary international juridical doctrine. The latter, or at least most of it, regrettably continues to follow an anachronistic and extremely outdated State-centered approach to the general issue of international responsibility. If it continues along these lines, without directly linking international responsibility of the States to international criminal responsibility of individuals, it runs the risk of becoming even more anachronistic, in addition to being inevitably non-significant. 32. International Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law must take each other into account, reciprocally and jointly, as the former focuses on the international responsibility of the State, and the latter on the international criminal responsibility of the individual, and both must be addressed in a concomitant manner, as the atrocities are not merely acts (or omissions) committed by isolated individuals on their own. In actual practice, atrocities have received support from the acquiescence, tolerance, or collaboration by the public authority of the State, in whose name said perpetrators often act. 33. There are cases of omissions both by the public authorities of the State and by broad sectors of the population itself (frequently terrorized). All this constitutes the existence of aggravating circumstances, in the midst of a protracted pattern of grave, flagrant and constant violations of human rights. These are, then, aggravated human rights violations. 34. The grave acts in the instant case of the Mapiripán Massacre speak for themselves, as can be seen in the chapter (No. VIII) of this Judgment on the facts proven before the Inter-American Court. They are set within the framework of the phenomenon of the socalled “paramilitarism” that arose in Colombia especially after 1985, when the State fostered the establishment of “self-defense groups,”, commonly called paramilitary (“constituted by death squads, groups of hired murderers, self-defense or private justice groups”), “severely damaging the country’s social stability.”13 35. In this convulsed context, as this Court noted in the instant Judgment, "The incursion of the paramilitary in Mapiripán was an act that had been meticulously planned several months before June 1997, carried out with logistic preparatory work and with the collaboration, acquiescence, and omissions by members of the Army. (...) The authorities knew of the attack against the civilian population in Mapiripán and they did not take the necessary steps to protect the members of the community” (para. 96(43)). The Court deemed it proven that “the Colombian army allowed ‘irregular flights’ that transported” the paramilitary to the area to land, and they “facilitated transportation of the paramilitary to Mapiripán"14. When they surrounded Mapiripán at dawn on July 15, 1997, the paramilitary “were wearing uniforms that were used exclusively by the military forces, they had short and long range weapons the use of which was restricted to the State, and they used high frequency radios. "15 And the Court added, in its account: 13 . Para. 96(2), (3) and (6). 14 . Para. 96(30), (31) and (32). 15 . Para. 96(34).