DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ALEJANDRO MONTIEL ARGÜELLO 1) I have dissented from the third operative paragraph of the preceding judgment because, in my opinion, the Court should have admitted the objection of lack of jurisdiction with regard to all the facts that allegedly gave rise to the State’s responsibility; consequently, it should have been decided that this responsibility does not exist and that the case should be dismissed and filed. 2) It is widely recognized that the Republic of El Salvador experienced one of the most difficult and critical moments of its history from 1979 to 1982, when there was an uprising by guerrilla groups who attempted to obtain political power through violence. The conflict was so severe that Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 became applicable, and also the intervention of the International Red Cross. 3) As a result of the conflict, many people were displaced, both abroad and to safer places; many families were dispersed and the members did not know each other’s whereabouts or that of their previous neighbors; moreover, files of courts, municipalities, and religious and charity organizations were destroyed. 4) This situation evidently created extreme difficulty in clarifying the truth in cases in which one of the groups was accused of violating someone’s human rights, even though the Government of El Salvador has made pertinent efforts. 5) This appears to be the reason why El Salvador (which had ratified the American Convention on Human Rights in 1978), only recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on June 6, 1995. Furthermore, this recognition was made restrictively, because it contains “the reservation that it recognizes this jurisdiction solely and exclusively in cases involving subsequent juridical facts and acts, or juridical facts and acts which commenced after the declaration of recognition had been deposited ...” 6) I am in complete agreement with those who would like all the 35 member countries of the Organization of American States to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights, since only 24 of them have done so, and all those who ratify it to recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, because currently only 21 countries do so. Moreover, the ratifications and the declarations of recognition contain numerous reservations and restrictions, all of which weaken considerably the American system for the protection of human rights. The system of the European Court of Human Rights is much more complete, following Protocol II and the Statute of the International Criminal Court. 7) Despite the above, our desire to attain the ideal should not lead us to disregard existing reservations and restrictions, but rather to apply them strictly; the contrary would not contribute to improving the system, rather it could have the effect of dissuading some States from taking part in it or doing so in a more restrictive way that at present. 8) In this case, the declaration of recognition should be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the usual meaning of its terms, and taking into accounts its object and purpose, in application of the general rule of interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.