6 provided for in domestic law, as it has been in other provisions before, fortunately repealed long ago by the vast majority of States. The formal “legality” of an action does not necessary modify its intrinsic “injustice” or “illegitimacy”, which is a frequently relevant issue when considering the compatibility of provisions or actions by domestic authorities with the principles and rules of the international law on human rights, which is the natural function of the courts within this purview. In this regard, I found the statements made by Mr. Nigel S. Rodley enlightening: “it is not possible to accept the notion that the administration of such punishments as stoning to death, flogging and amputation (…) can be deemed lawful simply because the punishment has been authorized in a procedurally legitimate manner (…).” 22. Therefore, the sufferings in the instant case are not naturally derived from the imposition of a lawful sanction —that is to say, a sanction that does not, in itself, undermine human dignity, which is the justification referred to in the last sentence of Article 1(1) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984. I have asserted and hereby emphasize that flogging is in itself contrary to human dignity. 23. We are not faced with an inevitable and inflexible, absolutely necessary sanction, the omission or replacement of which may jeopardize collective security or public peace, in such a manner that the preservation the legal order and the preponderance of justice may not be secured through less cruel means. This type of sanction is intended solely and exclusively to cause suffering, unable —and not even willing— to attain a plausible moral objective. It humiliates the person being punished and degrades the person administering the punishment. In raising his hand against a fellow man, brandishing an element devised to harm the body and overpower the spirit of the offender, even if ordered by the State, the person administering the punishment retrogrades several centuries in the history of our species. Flagellation is, ultimately, pure violence, which as such falls on the punished and the punisher alike and is far from being indicative of moral authority and righteous serenity in the State imposes and implements flagellation. 24. When a State becomes a party to an international treaty which prohibits this kind of punishment, it undertakes, as a general obligation, the duty to amend its domestic legislation to honor the international commitment made and follow the rules contained in the treaty. This may give rise to some tension between domestic law and international order— to which the State adheres through an act of its own sovereign will— as well as between domestic constitutional law and the secondary legal system. 25. The foregoing has occurred under a provision known as the “savings clause”. In the judgment of the instant case, reference is made to an order of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of 2002 related to a case prosecuted in the Bahamas and precisely concerning flagellation (Prince Pinder v. The Queen, Privy Council Appeal No. 40/2001 (Bahamas), September 23, 2002 (2003) 1 AC 620, para. 5). The Judicial Committee states that this punishment is inhuman and degrading, and as such it is proscribed by the constitutional provisions that condemn torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. However, the unlawful sanction survives thanks to the “savings clause” of the domestic Constitution. 26. Amending domestic law so that it conforms to the international standard accepted by the State is an obvious consequence of adherence to an international agreement. The exception contained in the aforementioned savings clause is irrelevant to such purposes, as it purports to exempt certain old provisions laid down by State legislation from constitutional provisions, which in the instant case