4 say —though perhaps suitable to insist on making the point once more—that in human rights violation proceedings the perpetration of this kind of violations is only and exclusively on trial and not the criminal liability of the individual, which must be established by the appropriate domestic courts in accordance with domestic law, and punished in a lawful manner, i.e. compatible with the provisions of the relevant domestic Constitution and with international provisions embraced by the State by way of conventions, or imperative provisions within the framework of jus cogens. Once again, it should be noted that a lawful purpose must be attained through equally lawful means. 13. The survival of measures, such as flagellation of an individual, exposes once again the existence, in the midst of the XXI century, of parallel chapters in the histories of crime and the justice system developed to fight against it on behalf of society and the State. It is, of course, a strange and dreadful parallelism, the chronicle of which is beyond the scope of this Separate Opinion, accompanying a judgment. The existence of a clear and exact borderline between crime and criminal justice —which must separate the unfair use of violence displayed by the criminal from the sanctioning role performed by the State— has not always been the case. This role should be justified, as mentioned earlier, on the ethical quality of its grounds, its means and its purposes. Criminal “justice” has frequently overstepped such mark. In this order, the Inter-American Court has joined the European Court in its eloquent reflection in the case of Tyrer v. United Kingdom, regarding corporal punishment: it is but institutionalized violence, an “assault” on a person’s dignity and physical integrity. Hence, it violates jus cogens and, for that very reason, it is deemed completely unacceptable. Rejection is absolute, beyond all historical, sociological or disciplinary reasons that may be used to support such punishment. 14. The obstinate presence of these forms of punishment, which constitute reminiscences of old oppressive practices, prompts a review of the purposes of the punishment imposed by the State on the offender. I do not deny the retributive nature the criminal sanction formally has and that has occasionally contributed to limit the display of violence, grading the punishment according to the weight of the offense committed. Nor do I oppose at this time its efficacy —more notional than real— as a way to deter (general deterrence) the commission of offenses. However, I believe it is convenient to retain for the moment, and in the absence of a better safeguard option, the project of social readaptation, reintegration or rehabilitation which has been ascribed to the penal consequences of crime and that is laid down extensively in many domestic and international documents, particularly in those concerning imprisonment, which, in the history of punishment has replaced capital punishment and corporal punishment. 15. Certainly, relevant criticisms have been made regarding this project associated with punishment. More often than not, these are reasonable remarks it is possible to share. However, we still lack —in real, effective terms rather than notional or conceptual— proper substitutes to replace it immediately, effectively and advantageously. Behind the decline of the rehabilitative theory of punishment await the eliminative and afflictive options, such as capital punishment and corporal punishment —e.g. mutilation, branding or flogging— respectively. That is why readaptation continues to be, in spite of its weaknesses and contradictions, a reasonable check on the absolute penal power of the State, which would otherwise know no limits. 16. The rehabilitative intention is to be found in Article 6(5) of the American Convention, which ascribes to punishment consisting of deprivation of liberty the “essential aim” of promoting “the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners.” If this is the purpose of such punishment —its teleological mission, which provides the basic sense to the “positive” action of the State towards convicts— the limit to