57 185. The Commission, on the basis of the information submitted by the parties, has made all possible efforts to fully identify all the alleged victims, either by their full name or by ties with their next of kin. Regarding this, the IACHR observes that the identity of three of the alleged victims had not been fully ascertained: i) the person known by the alias ‘Fredy,’ whom Ramón Isaza, leader of the SelfDefense Forces of Magdalena Medio, had supposedly called Alfonso Guizao Suárez; and ii) the spouse of alias ‘Fredy’. Nevertheless, the IACHR stresses that, according to proven facts, there were various witnesses who saw these persons detained, even when the person known by the alias ‘Fredy’ was with the persons who participated in two of the disappearances. Likewise, the Commission has a video where the person known by the alias ‘Fredy’ himself acknowledged that he was controlled by the SelfDefense Forces of Magdalena Medio. 186. The Commission notes that the State confined itself to objecting, in terms of the proceedings and admissibility, to the inclusion of these persons as alleged victims. Regarding this, taking into account “the nature of the facts and the time that has passed,” the Court itself finds it “reasonable that the identification and individualization of each presumed victim is difficult.”313 In view of the above considerations, the Commission incorporates the two above-mentioned persons in the review conducted below. 2. General considerations about attributing responsibility 187. The Commission deems it is relevant, beyond the evidence of direct involvement of state agents reflected in the section on proven facts, to present certain considerations about the phenomenon of paramilitarism in Colombia, as well as the consequences of said situation regarding the international responsibility that the State has incurred in the present case. 2.1. Relationship between the State and the establishment of paramilitary groups 188. Both the IACHR and the Court have issued rulings about the relationship between the State of Colombia and the establishment of paramilitary groups. Regarding this, the IACHR indicated that the State played an important role in the development of paramilitary or self-defense groups, which were permitted to act with legal protection and legitimacy in the decades of the seventies and eighties, and was responsible for their existence and strength.314 These groups, whether sponsored or accepted by the National Army, were largely established to combat groups of armed dissidents.315 The IACHR also contended that, as a result of their counterinsurgent motivation, paramilitary groups established ties with the armed forces which became increasingly consolidated for more than two decades.316 313 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 4, 2012. Series C No. 250, paragraph 51. 314 IACHR, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, OEA/Ser/L/V/III.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1, February 26, 1999, Chapter I, paragraphs 7-19; IACHR, Report No. 64/11, Case 12.573, Merits, Marino López and others (Operation Genesis), Colombia, March 31, 2011, paragraph 225. 315 IACHR, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1, February 26, 1999, Cap. I, paragraphs 7-19. 316 IACHR, Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1, February 26, 1999, Chapter I, paragraphs 7-19; IACHR Report No. 75/06. Jesús María Valle Jaramillo of October 16, 2006, paragraph 62.