mean that they are not the appropriate procedures to be followed. As the Inter-American Court has noted, the fact that a domestic remedy does not terminate in a favorable ruling for the petitioner does not demonstrate, alone, the lack of, or the exhaustion of all efficacious internal remedies. 29. The State suggests that Mr. Chaparro has an effective remedy in cassation, which he is at liberty to pursue once the Criminal Court issues its judgment in this case. This remedy is adequate in the sense that the Inter-American Court has noted in earlier cases, “adequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an infringement of a legal right.” In case the judges or courts have incurred in errors in iudicando, this is the adequate recourse to protect the legal situation that has been affected. Similarly, if the Supreme Court finds that the judges incurred in errors of law, it will grant cassation of the judgment and issue a new one that is in conformity with the domestic law. 30. The State further suggests that Mr. Chaparro has an additional effective remedy in a motion for revision, which he can file once a conviction is issued. This remedy is similarly adequate and effective in the opinion of the State. The State alleges that it has shown that effective remedies exist and now the burden of proof shifts to the petitioners who must demonstrate that they have exhausted the remedies available under Ecuadorian law. 31. As regards the issue of whether the judicial proceedings have been carried out within a “reasonable time,” the State recalls the jurisprudence of the European Court which has maintained that the “reasonableness” must be determined in the specific context of a concrete case, that there are no generally valid criteria that may be applied to all cases. Lastly, the State argues that Mr. Chaparro enjoyed the right to defend himself in this case and had access to the courts and at no time was he impeded from exercising his right to be heard before the appropriate and competent judicial organs. 2. Response of the State to Mr. Lapo, the second petitioner 32. The State replied on September 30, 2002 and attached the position of the Attorney General’s office, dated September 12, 2002, in which the Commission is requested immediately to Petition 172/99, since, in the view of the State, it does not fulfill the requirements set forth in Article 46 of the American Convention and Article 38 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure and in particular, because the facts do not reveal a possible violation of any of the articles of the American Convention. 33. The State notes that the Superior Court of Guayaquil by which Mr. Lapo obtained his liberty confirmed the dismissal and the Court found that he was not responsible for any of the crimes for which he had originally been accused. In this regard, the Ecuadorian State considers that by virtue of the “fourth instance” formula, the Commission is not competent to review the decisions of national courts that act within their spheres of competence and afford the appropriate judicial guarantees, unless it can be found that a violation of the Convention has been committed. In the view of the State Mr. Lapo had access to the entire panoply of remedies available under Ecuadorian law. Further, the State maintains that Mr. Lapo cannot argue that the proceedings were not carried out within a reasonable period of time since the jurisprudence of both the European and inter-American systems determine on a case by case basis whether the time period that has elapsed comes within the concept of “reasonable” depending on the complexity of the matter and the actions of the parties. 34. In the view of the State, the Commission is competent to declare a petition admissible and to determine whether a judgment of a national court has been issued at the margin of due process or is in apparent violation of some other right guaranteed by the Convention. In this case the State respected due process and Mr. Lapo cannot come before the Commission simply because he is not in agreement with the decision of the courts. In this case the State did not violate Articles 8