224. In this regard, the International Law Commission, in the Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, considered that a crime against humanity was the perpetration of specific inhumane acts in a systematic manner or on a large scale by a government or by an organization or group. 175 Thus, it recognizes three general condition: that the act(s) are committed as part of an act “committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale,” against the civilian population, and that the perpetrator(s) act “with full knowledge of this inhumane act”; in other words, it is carried out pursuant to a preconceived State plan or policy. 176 225. In the case of Dusko Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter, also “the ICTY”) considered that the requirements for crimes against humanity included: (i) that they were acts against the civilian population; (ii) that they were widespread and systematic acts; (iii) that they were acts undertaken on discriminatory grounds or committed for discriminatory reasons; (iv) that these acts responded to a policy of the State or of organizations, and (v) that the perpetrator was aware of the systematic or wider context in which the act occurred. In addition, and pursuant to the jurisdiction granted to the ICTY by its Charter, such acts should be committed during an armed conflict. 177 226. Meanwhile, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter, also “ICTR”) established in the judgment in the Takayasu case that the category of crimes against humanity could be broken down into four elements: (i) the act must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health; (ii) the act must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; (iii) the act must be committed against members of the civilian population; (iv) the act must be committed on one or more discriminatory grounds, namely, national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. 178 227. In the judgment in the case of Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter, also, “the SCSL”) stated that the elements of a crime against humanity are: (i) there must be an attack; (ii) the attack must be widespread or systematic; (iii) the attack must be directed against any civilian population; (iv) the acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack, and (v) the perpetrator must have Cf. UN. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session (6 May-26 July, 1996). A/51/10. p. 47. Commentaries 3, 4 and 5 on article 18 of the Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_51_10.pdf. 175 176 For a detailed analysis of the evolution and interpretation of the three general conditions for crimes against humanity, see UN. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-ninth session (1 May-2 June and 3 July-4 August 2017). A/72/10, pp. 33 and ff. 177 Cf. ICTY. Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić. Judgment of May 7, 1997. Case No. IT-94-1-T, paras. 627- 660. In particular, the ICTY referred to the requirements of “widespread” and “systematic” as follows: “It is therefore the desire to exclude isolated or random acts from the notion of crimes against humanity that led to the inclusion of the requirement that the acts must be directed against a civilian “population”, and either a finding of widespreadness, which refers to the number of victims, or systematicity, indicating that a pattern or methodical plan is evident, fulfils this requirement” (para. 648). See also: Prosecutor v. Kupreškić and Others. Judgment of January 14, 2000. Case of No. IT-95-16-T, paras. 647 to 658. 178 Cf. ICTR. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu. Judgment of September 2, 1998, Case of No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 578. In addition, the ICTR considered that “[t]he concept of ‘widespread’ may be defined as massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.” It added that “[t]he concept of ‘systematic' may be defined as thoroughly organised and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be adopted formally as the policy of a state. There must however be some kind of preconceived plan or policy.” (para. 580). 50