Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument, and 1, 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. i) The torture and murder of Vladimir Herzog and the context at the time of the facts 234. The Court notes that there is no dispute between the parties on this issue. Brazil has acknowledged its responsibility for the arbitrary detention, torture and murder of Vladimir Herzog by State agents in the Second Army’s DOI/CODI on October 25, 1975. 194 235. Also, witnesses of the events have testified on numerous occasions that Vladimir Herzog was hooded, subjected to electric shocks by a team of torturers and asphyxiated (supra para. 122). The indirect expert report on his death determined that, “first, Vladimir Herzog was strangled, probably with the belt cited by the forensic expert and, then, a gallows system was devised, one end of the belt was tied to the protective grillwork of the window, and the other to Vladimir Herzog’s neck by a slip knot. The body was then placed in partial suspension to simulate an actual hanging.” 195 236. The dispute exists only with regard to the possibility of prosecuting the perpetrators and to the application of the concept of crimes against humanity in 1975, and provisions such as the Brazilian Amnesty Law, the statute of limitations, the ne bis in idem principle, and res judicata. 237. According to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and other national and international courts and human rights bodies, the torture and murder of Mr. Herzog would be considered a very serious violation of human rights. However, in view of the need to establish whether the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for the torture and death of Vladimir Herzog as crimes against humanity persisted when Brazil accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, the Court must also analyze whether the torture and murder of Vladimir Herzog were: (i) perpetrated by State agents or by an organized group as part of a preconceived plan or strategy; in other words, with full intention and knowledge of the plan; (ii) in a widespread and systematic manner; (ii) against the civilian population, and (iv) with a discriminatory/prohibited purpose. To this end, the Court will examine the evidence provided to this case and the context and the facts that the Court has already found proved in the judgment in the case of Gomes Lund et al. 238. First, the Court must identify whether the facts were part of a State plan or strategy. In this regard, the Court considers that it has been proved that: a) The 1964 military coup d’état established itself based on a doctrine of national security and the promulgation of national security and emergency laws that “served as a supposed legal framework to provide the increased repression with legal support.” 196 The enemy could be anywhere in the country, could even be a Brazilian, and a popular mindset of constant control was established, typical of totalitarian States. To confront the new challenges, it was urgent to create a new repressive apparatus. Thus, different warlike concepts were adopted: adverse psychological 194 Cf. Answering brief of the State (merits file, folios 349 and 350). 195 Report of the National Truth Commission (evidence file, folio 3301). 196 Case of Gomes Lund et al. ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, para. 85. 53