is not part of the norms that constitute the supplementary means of interpretation, provided for in Article 32, the subsequent Article of the Vienna Convention. In other words, according to Article 31(4), the “special meaning [of a term] that the parties so intended” must be stated in one of the following ways: either in the agreements, instruments and practices referred to in Article 31, paragraphs 2 and 3 (which are distinguishable because they are intimately connected with the relevant treaty or because they refer to an agreement about its interpretation); or in a rule of international law that is applicable to the relations between the Member States. b.- Rule of the context and of the progressive or evolutive development. Now, following the State’s allegations, the Judgment refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 71 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 72 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 73 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 74 It also refers to the provisions of the Universal, 75 European 76 and African human rights systems, 77 and also to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 78 and of seven domestic constitutional courts. 79 The Judgment refers to all of them within the framework of the systematic and historical interpretation, even though it should have done so, in some cases, in application of the rule of the context (established in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention), and in other cases, in application of the rule of progressive development of law (provided for in Article 31(3) of the same convention). These agreements and instruments, however, lack the relevant features for being considered as instruments or agreements made as a consequence of or in connection with the Convention. Hence, they cannot be used as a means for interpreting the Convention. They neither refer, strictly speaking, to subsequent practice, to the way how States parties to the Convention apply this treaty, whereby showing their agreement regarding the Convention’s interpretation. As to the rules of international law applicable in the relations between the State parties, it is evident that they do not fulfill Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention’s requirement of being “relevant” to the case. Even more so, the provisions of the previously referred treaties, the statements of the aforementioned judgments of international and European courts, and the provisions of domestic law of Member States to the Convention—all of which were quoted for interpreting the latter—can be neither considered a kind of customary law nor a general principle of law. They are not international custom because they are not 71 Para.224. 72 Para.225. 73 Paras.227 and 228. 74 Paras. 229 to 233. 75 Para. 226. 76 Para. 234. 77 Para. 243. 78 Paras. 236 to 242. 79 Paras. 252, 261, and 262.