Finally, in order to justify its assertions, the Judgment resorts again to decisions, either absolutely foreign to the Convention Member States, or pertaining to only three of them. These grounds are not enough for reaching the attained conclusion. C.- Unanswered questions. The Judgment states that, due to the fact that an “‘absolute right to life of the embryo’ as grounds for the restriction of [other] rights […], is not supported by the American Convention,” “it is not necessary to make a detailed analysis of each of these requirements” required for restricting a right, this means, that “inferences are not abusive or arbitrary,” which are “substantively and formally established by law,” that pursue “a legitimate aim” and that meet “requirements of suitability, necessity and proportionality.” 90 In spite of this, the Judgment keeps on with this analysis in order “to indicate the way in which the sacrifice of the rights involved in this case was excessive in comparison to the benefits referred to with the protection of the embryo.” 91 By doing this, the Judgment contradicts itself, because it does not confront this sacrifice with a right (which, according to the Judgment does not apply to this case), but with the prohibition of the technique of in vitro fertilization. If the Judgment would have confronted this sacrifice with a right, it would have harmonized the rights at stake. Obviously, the result of the confrontation made by the Judgment cannot be different than the one that was reached. 92 This is so because—we repeat—there was no confrontation between rights, but between some rights and a technique. However, even in this case, the background material can only be used for reaching very partial conclusions regarding the technique of in vitro fertilization. As it has been said, assisted reproduction—of which in vitro fertilization is only one method—is not practiced in the majority of Member States to the Convention. It is practiced only in eleven of the twenty-four Member States, many of which forbid some proceedings related to this technique. The natural conclusion to these facts is not that “the Convention allows IVF to be performed,” 93 but that the majority of Member States have abstained from referring to it, probably because they have understood that this technique is not, per se, regulated by international law. This, together with the fact that the Judgment makes Article 4(1) inapplicable to the embryo—at least until the moment of implantation in the woman’s uterus—may make the majority of Member States understand that the regulation of this technique is within their internal, domestic or exclusive jurisdiction. 94 90 Para. 273. 91 Para. 273. 92 Paras. 277 ff. 93 Para. 256. 94 This concept was developed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its advisory opinion Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (February 7, 1923). In this opinion the Permanent Court concluded that the term domestic jurisdiction referred to issues that are not, in principle, regulated by international law, that is, matters where the State can take sovereign decisions. This may be the case, even though they may be closely related to the interests of more than one State.