Consequently, the aforementioned sentence was established in order to allow States to grant the unborn the legal protection that must be given to the right of “every person […] to have his life respected” “from the moment of conception.” In other words, such protection must be “common” to those who are born and to the unborn. Consequently, no distinction can be made in this respect among them, “even if they are of a different nature,” because they “constitute a whole.” There is human life in both the born and the unborn. Both are a human being, a person. The legally protected good in Article 4(1) is, then and ultimately, the right to life of “every person.” This is why the Convention decided to leave no doubt as to the fact that Article 4(1) protects life, irrespective of its stage of development. In this regard, the expression “in general” constitutes a reference to the way the law may protect the unborn. Needless to say, this protection could be different to that which is granted to the person who is already born. Consequently, the expression “and, in general” makes no reference to an exception, to an exclusion. Quite the opposite, this expression is inclusive. It makes applicable the obligation, to protect the right to life of every person by law, from the moment of conception. c.- “Conception”. Because of the aforementioned, in order to understand the relevant provision of Article 4(1), it is essential to elucidate the sense and scope of the term “conception,” included in this Article. It is from that moment that the State must protect by law the right “to have […] life respected.” In other words, the sense of this provision is clear, it states that this right exists “from the moment of conception.” The file and other background material show that, when signing the Convention, there was no determination as to what should be understood by “conception.” This has not been specified afterwards either. On the other hand, the Convention gave no “special meaning” to this term. 25 It neither made a reference to the understanding of this concept according to medical science. Hence, the applicable rule in this case is, without any doubt, that of the “ordinary meaning” of the term. 26 In particular, the meaning must be the one existing by the time of adopting the Convention in 1969. According to the 1956 version of the Spanish Dictionary of the Real Academia Española 27—applicable back then—, the term “conception” was understood as the “action and effect of conceiving;” “to conceive” was read as “for the female to become pregnant;” that of “pregnant” meant “the woman or the female of any species that has conceived, and has the fetus or creature in its womb;” that of “to make pregnant” as “to impregnate;” that of “impregnate” as “to make the female conceive;” and that of “fertilization” as “the union of the masculine and feminine reproductive elements, originating a new being.” 25 Art. 31(4) of the Vienna Convention. 26 Ibid. 27 18th edition.