And almost at the same time of adopting the Convention, that is, in the 1970 version of the aforementioned dictionary, 28 the term “to make pregnant” was understood as “to impregnate, to fertilize, to make a woman conceive.” The current dictionary also gives this definition. 29 The foregoing means that it was understood—and it still is—that the being, in this case the human, originates with “the union of the masculine and feminine reproductive elements.” When this happens, it is recognized that this “creature” is inside the woman’s “womb.” Hence, it was understood that the terms fertilization and to make the woman conceive were synonyms. Therefore, the term “conception,” used by Article 4(1) of the Convention, should be legally understood—notwithstanding any other consideration—as the fertilization of the egg by the spermatozoid. This, nothing else, was agreed when adopting the Convention in 1969. This is still the legal understanding of this term. Furthermore, an important part of medical science—if not the majority— 30shares this understanding. 31 This does not mean that medical science must be disregarded, but that its teachings must be considered only insofar as they are incorporated in the law. In this regard, due attention must be paid also to the fact that, according to the rules of treaty interpretation, there are no other agreements or treaties among the States parties to the Convention enshrining a different concept. 32 Member States have neither made subsequent agreements nor adopted practices in the application of the Convention that may indicate an alteration of this concept. 33 On the other hand, there is no applicable customary rule that may go against the aforementioned interpretation. Finally, it cannot be asserted that domestic legislations of these States have created a general principle of law enshrining a meaning diverse to the aforementioned. 34 Furthermore, it is evident and clear that Article 4(1) refers to the “conception” of “every person” whose right to life must be protected by law. This is in perfect agreement with the context of terms, 35 because this Article, as the Convention, 36 refers only to the object “every person.” It does not refer to a different entity, object or reality. Hence, if the aforementioned provision would have sought to grant or extend this protection—that must be given by law to the right of every person to have his or her life respected—to an entity, object or reality other than the person, it would have 28 19th edition. 29 22nd edition. 30 Notes 266 to 284 of the Judgment. 31 Paras. 79 ff. 32 Art. 31(2) of the Convention. Art. 31(3)(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention. Art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. 33 34 35 Art. 31(3) of the Vienna Convention. 36 Art. 1(1) of the Convention, previously quoted.