29 110. In this respect, the IACHR notes the decisions of the European Court when it affirms that the risk or harm generated by the presence of homosexuals in the armed forces must be demonstrated convincingly.108 In this regard, the European Court has stated that the supposed threat to the institutional operational capacity of the armed forces is based on stereotyped conceptions against homosexual persons that far from justifying the restriction in question constitutes an attitude comparable to prejudicial treatment on grounds of color or origin of persons.109 111. Thus the Commission considers that the criterion used by the military authorities was based on an apparent incompatibility between homosexuality and the regime of military discipline and the military institution itself, without providing reasonable and objective reasons to justify that distinction. The Commission does not find the relationship between means and ends, as between punishing “acts of homosexuality” in the armed forces and upholding the military values sought to be protected, such as honor, dignity, discipline, and extolling civic-mindedness. Stating otherwise would imply ascribing a negative moral value to the sexual act between persons of the same sex itself, in addition to promoting the stigmatization of gay, lesbian or bisexual persons, those perceived as such, or those who maintain relations with persons of the same sex inside and outside the armed forces. 112. Accordingly, that decision was translated into an act of the State that did not meet the requirement of suitability and, therefore, constituted an arbitrary distinction, incompatible with the Convention. Accordingly, the Commission can dispense with any reference to the other aspects of the analysis. 113. In relation to the subject matter of the instant case, the IACHR takes note of the various pronouncements of the European Court and the Human Rights Committee on the incompatibility of sanctions provisions —be they criminal or disciplinary— regarding sexual practices between persons of the same sex with international human rights law.110 In addition, the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights has noted that, in general, such laws are used to “to harass and prosecute individuals because of their actual or perceived sexuality or gender identity.”111 In addition, in comparative law it has been noted that such provisions have “no other purpose than to criminalize conduct which fails to 108 See in general: European Court of Human Rights, Case of Perkins and R v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 43208/98 and 44875/98, October 22, 2002, final decision of January 22, 2003; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Beck, Copp and Bazeley v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 48535/99, 48536/99 and 48537/99, Judgment of October 22, 2002, final decision of January 22, 2003; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom, Applications 31417/96 and 32377/96, Judgment of September 27, 1999, final decision of December 27, 1999; European Court of Human Rights, Case of Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, judgment of September 27, 1999, final decision of December 27, 1999. 109 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Perkins and R v. United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 43208/98 and 44875/98, October 22, 2002, final decision of January 22, 2003, para. 90. 110 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Judgment of October 22, 1981, para. 60, European Court of Human Rights, Case of Norris v. Ireland, Application No. 10581/83, Judgment of October 26, 1988, para. 46; European Court of Human Rights, Case of A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, Application No. 35765/97, Judgment of July 31, 2000, paras. 37-38. United Nations, Human Rights Committee Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992 (1994), paras. 8.5 and 8.6. 111 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, A/HRC/19/41, November 17, 2011, para. 40.