30 conform with the moral or religious views of a section of society.”112 It has also been established that sexual orientation cannot itself be considered a basis for punishment, thus the provisions that “punish solely and exclusively those with that status [homosexual]” entail clear discrimination that promotes the stigmatization of homosexual persons.113 114. In summary, the Commission deems that the considerations set forth in the case-law indicated make it possible to establish that provisions that punish a given group of persons for engaging in a consensual sexual act or practice with another person of the same sex are not admissible, for this is directly at odds with the prohibition on discrimination based on sexual orientation. This prohibition should be understood as described above, i.e. that such provisions ought not be used to repress or sanction a person due to his or her actual or perceived sexual orientation. 115. In addition, the IACHR observes that the Rules establish a difference in treatment and punishment in cases of “illegitimate sexual acts” and “acts of homosexuality.” The IACHR observes that the Rules do not define “illegitimate sexual acts.” The petitioners note that the notion of “illegitimate sexual acts” apparently refers to sexual relations between persons of different sex in the absence of marriage or outside of marriage. The State does not refute this argument. Independent of the meaning ascribed to “illegitimate sexual acts,” the IACHR notes that at the time of the facts that are the subject of the instant case, the internal military regulations included separate provisions with differentiated sanctions for “illegitimate sexual acts” on the one hand, and “acts of homosexuality” on the other. 116. The Rules of Military Discipline, at Article 117, established that if an officer of the Armed Forces engaged in “acts of homosexuality”, Article 87(i) of the Law on Armed Forces Personnel would have been applicable, i.e. discharge in the interest of good service, whether due to “misconduct or professional incompetence.” This sanction was differentiated from that applied in cases in which an officer committed “illegitimate sexual acts,” as these were considered a “severe infraction”.114 117. The IACHR notes that the Rules established three distinct types of infractions with different sanctions depending on the seriousness of the infraction. Accordingly, moderate infractions (faltas leves) (such as “appearing in uniform with persons of ill repute or poor conduct”) were sanctioned by simple censure or reprimand (“llamado de atención”), and simple arrest (arresto simple) of one to three days. Serious infractions (faltas graves) (such as “bringing women into military facilities with dishonorable aims”) would be sanctioned by solemn censure (censura solemne); simple arrest for four to eight days, and “strict arrest” (“arresto de rigor”) for one to nine days. Finally, severe infractions (faltas atentatorias) (such as committing “illegitimate sexual acts,” “insistent sexual harassment of military or civilian personnel or family members” or working with and administering houses of prostitution), entailed as disciplinary measures strict arrest of 10 to 15 days, strict arrest at another facility for three to 10 days, and suspension of 10 to 30 days.115 118. And so the Rules of Military Discipline, in addition to establishing a sanction for sexual acts by persons of the same sex, which the IACHR already concluded does not satisfy the requirement of 112 Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 11/98, The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. Minister of Justice and Others, October 9, 1998, para. 26.b. 113 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment C-507, July 14, 1999, para. 5.11. 114 Rules of Military Discipline of the Armed Forces of 1998, Article 67. 115 Rules of Military Discipline of the Armed Forces of 1998, Articles 65 and 73.