d. In the communication of June 11, 1999, from the Office of the Prosecutor of Pichincha, the pre-indictment statement was not excluded, but instead was validated noting that even though the medical experts concluded that there were injuries, these facts “contradicted the statement made by [Eusebio Domingo Revelles] to the Representative of the Office of the Public Prosecutor.” e. Lastly, on November 24, 1998, the Fourth Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice, which issued its decision on the “confirmation” of the Judgment of the Second Court for Criminal Matters of Pichincha, in its considerations of fact noted that “the pre-indictment evidence, in particular the statements given in this proceeding by this defendant and his fellow members of the drug trafficking ring lead to the inference that Domingo Revelles acted on his own free will and conscience.” It was also noted that “the defendant himself recognized in the preindictment stage […][that] he was directly involved in the meetings of the group in which they dealt with the amount and quality of existing cocaine […].” 186. The Commission finds that the exclusionary rule means that when there is any denunciation of any evidence or statement obtained through torture, the authorities conducting the investigation and criminal proceedings must immediately open a serious investigation to clarify what has happened and, when appropriate, exclude such evidence or statement. To proceed with a criminal trial, assigning full validity to evidence and statements that are alleged to have obtained though torture, without opening an investigation into it, constitutes clear disregard for the exclusionary rule. 187. The Commission notes that in the instant case, the different authorities that ruled on the guilt of Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles, did so not only taking into account but attaching a heavy probative value to his pre-indictment statement given through coercion. None of the judicial authorities, who heard the case, examined the complaint of coercion or the requirement, stemming therefrom, to exclude such confessions. 188. In addition to the denunciation made in the initial statement before the judge and the medical certificates of August 9, 1994, Mr. Domingo Revelles contested the order to institute trial proceedings by challenging the content of the pre-indictment statement, in reply to which the Fourth Chamber for Criminal Matters of the Superior Court of Justice ruled noting that Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles “[…] attempted to circumvent his participation and responsibility for the unlawful criminal offense which is the subject of the instant proceeding, by claiming facts and circumstances that totally contradict the content of his pre-indictment statement.” The Fourth Chamber asserted that this pre-indictment statement, “corroborated by the investigation report in the instant criminal action, constitutes a serious presumption of guilt, as provided for under Article 116 of the Special Law on the Subject Matter.” 189. Based on all evidence introduced thus far, the pre-indictment statements of both Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles, and the other detainees, which also claim that their pre-indictment statements were given though coercion, were not excluded as evidence from the case. In the case of Mr. Eusebio Domingo Revelles, the statements were used as the basis to establish his criminal responsibility and, even though remedies for relief were pursued, he was unsuccessful at getting his statement excluded from the case. Consequently, the Commission finds that the State violated the rights set forth in Articles 8.3 and 25 of the American Convention in connection with Article 1.1 of the same instrument. 2. Right to a Defense 190. Article 8.2.d. of the American Convention establishes the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel.” Additionally, Article 8.2e establishes “the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law.” 44