SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE A. A. CANÇADO TRINDADE 1. I subscribe to the decision of the Court to reject the preliminary objection raised by the respondent Government, and to continue to hear the instant case on its merits. I feel obliged to add this Separate Opinion in order to leave on record the basis of my reasoning and my position on the central point of the preliminary objection presented by the Government of Peru, that is, the objection raised before the Court of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in the circumstances of the present case of Loayza Tamayo. 2. May I, first of all, reiterate my understanding, expressed in my Dissenting Opinion in the Resolution of the Court of 18 May 1995 in the case of Genie Lacayo concerning Nicaragua, to the extent that, in the context of the international protection of human rights, the preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies is one of pure admissibility (and not of competence), and, as such, in the current system of the American Convention on Human Rights, should be resolved in a well-founded and definitive manner by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 3. Contrary to what may be inferred, the extensive interpretation of the Court’s own faculties, which it advanced in the cases concerning Honduras,1 so as to comprise also issues related to preliminary objections of admissibility (based on a question of fact), does not always necessarily contribute to a more effective protection of the guaranteed human rights. In reality, such a conception leads to the undesirable reopening and reexamination of an objection of pure admissibility, which obstruct the procedure and thereby perpetuate a procedural imbalance which favors the respondent party. This is not a question of “restricting” the powers of the Court in particular, but rather of strengthening the system of protection as a whole, in its current stage of historical evolution, remedying such imbalance, and thus contributing to the full realization of the object and purpose of the American Convention on Human Rights. 4. The preliminary objections, if and when interposed, should be, by their very definition, in limine litis, at the stage of admissibility of the petition and before any and all consideration of the merits. This applies even more forcefully when dealing with a preliminary objection of pure admissibility, as is that of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in the present context of protection. If this objection is not raised in limine litis, it is tacitly waived (as the Court has already admitted, for example, in the Gangaram Panday case, concerning Suriname,)2 and, more recently, in the Castillo Páez case, concerning Peru.3 1 Judgments of 1987 on Preliminary Objections, in the cases of Velásquez Rodríguez, paragraph 29; Godínez Cruz, paragraph 32; and Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, paragraph 34. 2 Judgment of 1991 on Preliminary Objections, Gangaram Panday case, paragraphs 39-40; see also the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Neira Alegría et al. case concerning Peru, of the same year, paragraphs 30-