8 32. Consequently, if the period of thirty days indicated in Article 31(1) of the Rules of Procedure of this Court should be considered in calendar terms, and the notification of the application was made on February 13, 1995, the date on which it was received by the Government, the deadline was March 13, 1995, whereas the preliminary objection brief reached the Secretariat of the Court on March 24, 1995. 33. The Court has declared that: [i]t is a commonly accepted principle that the procedural system is a means of attaining justice and that the latter cannot be sacrificed for the sake of mere formalities. Keeping within certain timely and reasonable limits, some omissions or delays in complying with procedure may be excused, provided that a suitable balance between justice and legal certainty is preserved (Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 26, para. 42; Paniagua Morales et al Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 25, 1996. Series C No. 23, para. 38). 34. The Court observes that the brief in which the Government filed its preliminary objections was presented a few days after expiration of the period of thirty days set by Article 31(1) of its Rules of Procedure, but that this delay cannot be considered excessive within the limits of timeliness and reasonableness considered by this Tribunal to be necessary for excusing a delay in meeting a deadline (see supra 33, Paniagua Morales et al Case, paras. 37 and 39). Further, that this very Court has exercised flexibility vis-à-vis the periods established in the Convention and in its Rules of Procedure, including that indicated in Article 31(1) of the Rules of Procedure, and has often granted extensions requested by the parties when they have shown reasonable cause. 35. In the instant case, the Court considers that, although the Government did not expressly request an extension, this omission was possibly due to its mistaken reckoning of the period, excluding the non-working days in accordance with its procedural rules. For the reasons adduced, the review of the preliminary objection presented by Peru should proceed. V 36. The Government filed the preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on the ground that the Inter-American Commission lodged the petition against it without fulfilling the provisions of Article 46(2) of the Convention, inasmuch as the case against María Elena Loayza-Tamayo for the crime of terrorism was still pending in the Supreme Court of Justice with the number 950-94. 37. This objection is based essentially on the charge that: a. The exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, governed by Article 46(2) of the Convention, do not apply in the instant case, inasmuch as María Elena Loayza-Tamayo was not denied access to those domestic remedies. While it is true that at the time of the alleged victim's arrest the remedy of habeas corpus which, according to the Commission was in process against the deprivation of liberty, had been suspended under Decree Law No. 25.659 as it pertains to the crimes of treason and terrorism, owing to the State of Emergency, Mrs. Loayza-Tamayo did have access