Tenure is a guarantee of judicial independence; and is itself composed of the following guarantees: permanence in office, an adequate promotion procedure, and no unjustified dismissal, or removal at will.56 In addition, tenure should ensure the reinstatement in office of any judge who may be arbitrarily deprived of this.57 This does not mean that provisional judges have an unlimited permanence in their functions, but they should be guaranteed a certain term in office.58 In other words, they should have the certainty of permanence for a set time, which protects them from pressure from different sectors.59 40. In the same way, the ICourtHR argued that Article 8(1) recognizes that “[e]very person has a right to a hearing […] by an independent […] judge or court.” The terms in which this article is drafted indicate that the subject of the right is the defendant, the person situated in front of the judge who will decided the case that has been submitted to him. Two obligations arise from this right: the first of the judge, and the second of the State. The judge has the obligation to be independent; an obligation that he meets when he judges only in accordance with – and based on – the law. Meanwhile, the State has the obligation to respect and ensure, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Convention, the right to a hearing by an independent judge. The obligation of respect consists in the negative obligation of the public authorities to abstain from interfering unduly in the Judiciary or with its members; in other words, in relation to the specific judge. The obligation of guarantee consists in preventing the said interferences and investigating and punishing those who commit them. In addition, the obligation of prevention consists in the adoption, pursuant to Article 2 of the American Convention, of an appropriate legal framework that ensures an adequate appointment procedure, the tenure of judges, and the other requirements. 41. Now, the said State obligations give rise, in turn, to rights for the judges and for all other citizens. For example, the guarantee of an adequate appointment procedure for judges necessarily entails the right of the citizen to have access to public office in equal conditions; the guarantee of not being subject to removal at will signifies that, in the case of judges, the disciplinary and punishment procedures must necessarily respect the guarantees of due process, and those subject to such procedures must be provided, among other matters, with an effective remedy; the guarantee of stability should translate into an appropriate employment regime for judges, in which transfers, promotions, and other conditions are sufficiently controlled and respected. 42. Lastly, in the case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, the ICourtHR examined the arbitrary dismissal of the provisional criminal judge of first instance from the Judicial Circumscription of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, without the minimum guarantees of due process and without adequate grounds, without the possibility of being heard, and of exercising her right of defense, and without having been provided with an effective judicial remedy to contest the violations of her rights, all as a result of the absence of guarantees in the Judiciary’s transition process. 43. The Inter-American Court reiterated that one of the main purposes of the separation of public powers is the guarantee of the independence of judges. The objective of protection stems from the need to avoid the judicial system, in general, and its members, in particular, being subjected to possible undue constraints in the exercise of their functions 56 Ibidem, para. 79. 57 Ibidem, para. 81. 58 Ibidem, paras. 115 and 116. 59 Ibidem, para. 117. 11