43 of dignity, which is based on both the principle of the autonomy of the individual, and the idea that all individuals should be treated equally, as ends in themselves in accordance with their intentions, will and the decisions they take about their life. Meanwhile, the second paragraph establishes the sanctity of private and family life, among other protected spheres. The Court has affirmed that this sphere of the private life of the individual is characterized by being a space of liberty exempt and immune from arbitrary and abusive interference by third parties or public authorities.164 150. That said, a crucial aspect of the recognition of dignity is every human being’s possibility of self-determination and free choice of the options and circumstances that give a meaning to his or her existence in keeping with their own choices and beliefs.165 In this context, the principle of the autonomy of the individual plays an essential role, and prohibits any State action that attempts to “instrumentalize” individuals; in other words, convert them into a means for purposes unrelated to their choices about their own life, body and full development of their personality within the limits imposed by the Convention.166 151. In this regard, the Court has interpreted Article 7 of the American Convention broadly by indicating that it includes the concept of liberty in a wide-ranging sense as the capacity to do or not to do everything that is legally permitted. In other words, it constitutes the right of everyone to organize, based on the law, their individual and social life in keeping with their own choices and beliefs. Liberty, thus defined, is a basic human right, inherent in the attributes of the person, which permeates the whole American Convention.167 Even though neither the Commission nor the representative explicitly argued the violation of Article 7 of the Convention in this case, this does not prevent the Court from applying it based on the general legal principle of iura novit curia, which international case law has used repeatedly, in the sense that the judge has the authority, and even the duty, to apply the pertinent legal provisions in a case, even when they have not been expressly cited by the parties.168 152. The Court has also stipulated that the protection of the right to private life is not limited to the right to privacy, because it encompasses a series of factors related to the dignity of the individual, including, for example, the ability to develop one’s own personality and aspirations, determine one’s own identify, and define one’s own personal relations. The concept of private life encompasses aspects of physical and social identity, including the right to personal autonomy, personal development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and with the external world.169 The effectiveness of the exercise of the right to private life is decisive for the possibility of exercising personal autonomy over the future course of events that are relevant for a Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, supra, para. 194, and Case of the Santa Bárbara Campesino Community v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 1, 2015. Series C No. 299, para. 200. 164 Cf. Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile. Merits reparations and costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 136, and Case of Flor Freire v. Ecuador, supra, para. 103. 165 Article 32 of the American Convention, entitled “Relationship between Duties and Rights”, establishes that: 1. Every person has responsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind. 2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society. 166 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 52, and Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2012. Series C No. 257, para. 142. 167 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 163, and Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname. Merits reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2015. Series C No. 309, para. 259. 168 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010. Series C No. 215, para. 129, and Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 143. 169