41 Articles 11(2) and 17(2) of the Convention.” Regarding the inexistence of discrimination de iure, the State indicated that Bolivian law on the provision of health services was not exclusive, and furthermore, there was no discrimination whatsoever or discriminating criteria in the regulations on choice and informed consent (Health Regulation MSPS 4-98), or in the surgical protocols applied in this specific case. Consequently, it argued that “there is no provision whatsoever in relation to reproductive health that, based on discrimination, limits the exercise of the reproductive rights of women.” In addition, the State argued the inexistence of discrimination de facto, because the “the medical personnel performed their tasks professionally, and without making any distinctions to the detriment of I.V.” It argued that actions, such as the performance of the caesarean section to protect her life and that of the baby, were carried out in accordance with the patient’s needs. Therefore, in its opinion, there was no record showing that the alleged numerous forms of discrimination existed, based on the fact that I.V. was a woman, a migrant, and with scarce financial resources, because she was provided with every possibility of access to health care services, and the respective controls to protect her maternal health. 141. Regarding the supposed existence of a systematic pattern of forced sterilization, the State indicated that tubal ligation “can never be classified as a practice of forced sterilization based on discriminatory criteria, seeking to portray the State as a violator of human rights, as if its actions were aimed at arbitrarily limiting the reproductive freedom of women through a mass, obligatory and systematic government birth control policy, an argument that [… it] reject[ed]] because it was totally divorced from reality.” It also argued that, the instant case “absolutely cannot be compared to the acts of forced sterilization [that occur in other countries and] that, based on a poverty control policy, take away the right of women to decide if and when to have children, thus affecting the country’s marginalized and indigenous communities […].” 142. Lastly, the State rejected the facts alleged in this case, because they did not accord with the provisions of Articles 17(2) and 11(2), in relation to Article 1(1) of the Convention, since “the presumed violation of I.V.’s family life was not the result of a specific act or omission of the State to this end, but rather the result of a free, voluntary and rational decision not to conceive more children.” Accordingly, the State asked the Court to declare that the State had not violated the said provisions. A.6 Arguments on the right of women to a life free from violence (Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará) 143. The Commission considered that non-consensual sterilization also violated I.V.’s right to live free of all forms of violence in violation of Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. In this regard, the Commission argued that “performing a non-consensual sterilization causes the woman concerned pain and suffering and constitutes a form of violence, with ongoing physical and psychological consequences for her reproductive health.” It indicated that this had been expressly recognized in the laws of several Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Venezuela, which classified forced sterilization as a form of obstetric or autonomous violence. In the instant case, the Commission argued that, as a result of her sterilization. I.V. had been prevented, permanently, from exercising her reproductive autonomy to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of her children using the methods available to facilitate that right. On this basis, the Commission concluded that, in this regard, the State had violated the obligation to refrain from any act or practice of violence against women in violation of the obligations established in Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. 144. The representative agreed with the legal grounds and conclusions set forth by the Commission in its Merits Report in relation to the violation of Article 7 (a, b, c, f and g) of the Convention of Belém do Pará.