34 129. The Inter-American Court has defined property as “those material objects that may be appropriated, and also any right that may form part of a person’s patrimony; this concept includes all movable and immovable property, corporal and incorporeal elements, and any other intangible object of any value.” 137 130. The Commission takes it has proven that owing to the limited precision and enormous antipersonnel power of cluster munitions (see Section IV.A above), the bombing of the village of Santo Domingo caused destruction to homes and properties in it. It is also taken as proven that in some of the homes property was stolen and destroyed by the soldiers who arrived in the village after the incident. The Commission finds that these facts constitute a violation of the right to property enshrined in Article 21(1) and (2) of the Convention, in conjunction with the obligations set forth in Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Plinio Granados, Milciades Bonilla, Emilia Calderón, Mario Galvis, Olimpo Cárdenas, María Panqueva, Víctor Julio Palomino, Margarita Tilano Yánez, Hugo Ferney Pastrana Vargas, María Antonia Rojas, and other surviving victims who lived in the village of Santo Domingo, and that their property was looted or destroyed and/or their homes damaged. C. Freedom of movement and residence (Article 22(1) of the American Convention in connection with Article 1(1) thereof) 131. Article 22(1) of the American Convention provides: 1. Every person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the right to move about in it, and to reside in it subject to the provisions of the law. 132. The Inter-American Court has determined that Article 22(1) of the Convention “protects the right not to be forcefully displaced within a State Party [thereto]” 138 and that “freedom of movement is an indispensable condition for free development of each person.” 139 The Court has also recognized that given the complexity of the issue of internal displacement and the broad array of human rights it affects or jeopardizes, and given the especially vulnerable and defenseless status of most displaced persons, they could be deemed to have, de facto, no protection [...] Under the American Convention, this would oblige States to grant them preferential treatment and take 137 I/A Court H.R., Ivcher Bronstein Case v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C, No. 74, par. 122; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C, No. 148, par. 174. 138 I/A Court H.R., Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C, No. 134, par. 188. “The Court has concurred with the conclusion of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 27, where it establishes that freedom of movement and of residence consist, inter alia, of the following: a) the right of those lawfully in the territory of a State to move about freely in that State and to choose their place of residence; and b) the right of each person to enter their country and remain in it. Enjoyment of this right does not depend on any specific objective or motive of the person who wishes to move about or to remain in a certain place.” 139 I/A Court H.R., Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C, No. 134, par. 168; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C, No. 124, par. 110, and I/A Court H.R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C, No. 111, par. 115. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27 of November 2, 1999, paras. 1, 4, 5, and 19.