obligation that the provision be provided for by law is aimed at ensuring that the restrictions are not arbitrarily left to the discretion of public authorities.67 105. The IACHR notes that in order to justify the dismissal, the employer invoked Article 5(h) of Legislative decree 24514 on Job Security, enacted by the Congress of the Republic on June 5, 1986, and according to which, “The following constitute serious infractions: (h) […] serious verbal misconduct against the employer, its representatives, senior staff, or coworkers.” In these types of cases, it is not necessary for the definition of the infraction to meet the levels of specificity required in criminal matters. Nevertheless, when the issue concerns an infraction that carries an onerous penalty, the provision must be clear in terms of its content and scope, as this is the only way to ensure that individuals will be able to conduct themselves in keeping with the law. This does not mean that the infractions have to be defined with absolute precision, but the penalty does have to be foreseeable, and the provisions must not be susceptible to arbitrary interpretations by the employer. 106. In addition, in matters concerning limitations to freedom of expression in a labor context, the terms of the regulation must be especially careful to prevent fear and self-censorship among workers’ representatives. 107. In this case, the IACHR finds that the terms of the law on which Mr. Lagos del Campo’s dismissal was based are vague and imprecise, particularly because they do not define the scope of application for purposes of protecting speech about matters of public interest or the speech of workers’ representatives acting in their capacity as such. The Commission finds that this, in addition to affecting foreseeability with respect to the prohibited conduct, in practice renders the defense of workers’ rights illusory. Similarly, given that this violation has occurred as a result of the application of a law that does not meet the requirements of legality, Peru also breached Article 2 of the American Convention, which requires States to adopt legislative or other measures that are necessary to give effect to the rights and freedoms recognized in the treaty. 108. Having said this, the Commission must nonetheless examine whether the restriction or limitation in this case served some legitimate State imperative and whether it was strictly necessary to achieve that purpose, to provide a systematic and thorough discussion of the possible violations of the right to freedom of expression that the case sub judice may involve. Legitimate purpose 109. The second matter that must be reviewed when examining whether a restriction on the freedom of expression is compatible with Article 13.2 of the Convention refers to identifying the objective being sought by the restrictive measure. Indeed, the restriction shall only be legitimate if it seeks to achieve one of the objectives enshrined in Article 13.2 of the Convention. 110. The Commission notes that the provision seeks to protect a harmonious workplace and the hierarchical order within a company, therefore protecting the honor and reputation of others who work at the company, whether they are employers or even other employees. As stated previously, this purpose is compatible with the text of the American Convention, which recognizes the subsequent imposition of liability for the exercise of freedom of expression in order to protect the right of individuals to their honor and reputation. Necessity of the restriction in a democratic society 111. According to the criteria examined above (supra paras. 73-98), when conducting the third part of this test, the question that the Commission must answer is whether the penalty that was imposed 67 Cfr. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, paragraph 40, and Case of Claude-Reyes et al. v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151, paragraph 89. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008, Series C, No. 177, paragraph 63. 21