87. The fact that a measure restricting freedom of expression is established clearly and specifically in a law is not enough for it to be considered lawful. Under the terms of Article 13.2 of the Convention, it must be determined whether the aim pursued by the restriction is lawful and justified under the American Convention. As previously mentioned, Article 13.2 of the Convention establishes that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression is subject only to the subsequent imposition of liability to the extent necessary to ensure “respect for the rights or reputations of others,” or “the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.” Along these lines, the Commission notes that in an employment relationship, restrictions of certain expressions that may be detrimental to a harmonious workplace, the reputation and good name of employers and employees, or the hierarchical order within the company may result legitimate. 88. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to maintain that it is sufficient for the restriction to freedom of expression to have a legitimate aim in order for it to be consistent with the Convention. Article 13.2 of the Convention requires that the restriction be suitable, necessary, and strictly proportional to accomplish that legitimate aim. The examination of the suitability of a restriction to the right to freedom of expression focuses on determining whether the measure effectively allows for the attainment of the legitimate aim pursued. In other words, it is necessary to evaluate whether the limitations appropriately contribute to the attainment of aims compatible with the American Convention, or whether they are able to contribute to the realization of those objectives. The need for the measure is determined by evaluating whether the restrictions are essential for the achievement of the legitimate aim, or whether there are other, less harmful measures. Finally, and provided that they are necessary and suitable, the restrictions must be strictly proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and narrowly tailored to the attainment of that objective, interfering as little as possible with the lawful exercise of that freedom. Assessing the strict proportionality of the limitation measure requires determining whether the sacrifice of freedom of expression that it entails is exaggerated or disproportionate to the advantages obtained through its use. 89. In labor-related matters, the strict proportionality of restrictions to freedom of expression must be judged on the basis of their effects on the right of labor organizations and their leaders to seek the protection of their constituents’ rights. The right to freedom of expression in these cases is intrinsically linked to the objective of freedom to organize trade unions. The Commission finds that, in order to be considered proportional, penalties against a worker for exercising freedom of expression in this context cannot have a chilling effect on the rights of labor or trade union leaders to defend and advocate for the rights and interests of the people they represent. 90. This balancing test must also take account of the fact that in a democratic society there is a slim margin for any restriction on political speech or speech concerning matters of public interest. In a democratic and pluralist system, expressions, information, and opinions regarding matters of public interest, the State, and government institutions, enjoy greater protection under the American Convention. This means that the State must more rigorously abstain from limiting these forms of expression, and that, because of their public nature, the entities and employees of the State, as well as those who aspire to hold public office, must have a higher threshold of tolerance for criticism.58 ii) Positive obligations of the State to safeguard the right to freedom of expression from interference by non-State actors 91. In accordance with the inter-American case law and doctrine, the American Convention requires that the States Parties not only respect the rights enshrined therein but also guarantee that the persons under their jurisdiction are able to exercise those rights. The IACHR has therefore affirmed that, “The continuum of human rights obligations is not only negative in nature; it also requires positive action from States.”59 58 59 I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 127. IACHR. Report No. 80/11, Case 12.626, Merits, Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. United States. July 21, 2011. Para. 117. 18