51 Criminal Cassation (supra par. 95), and (7) August 7, 1995, the defense teams submitted writs of queja to the Supreme Court for denying the appeal of exception (supra par. 96). 194. The Court can also verify that the National Chamber of Criminal Cassation, in its April 3, 1995 judgment, stated, “[i]t is true that the process has been underway for over 14 years […], [b]ut considering the particular characteristics of this case and its uncommon volume, the large number of objections, including by those convicted and by those acquitted, the complexity of the offenses under investigation that involved 14 Air Force units located in various parts of the country, and the many difficulties that such a circumstance naturally entails, it is clear that the amount of time the process lasted in the military jurisdiction cannot be considered on a par with the type of “extraordinary and inordinate” delay suggested by the Supreme Court as grounds for its judgment in the […] ‘Mozzatti’ case.” 195. Based on the actions as outlined, the Court deems that during the processing of the case in the domestic system, both the judicial authorities and the defense teams of the alleged victims took many actions that clearly constituted delaying tactics in the processing of the case. The Court deduces, nonetheless, from the evidence supplied, that the process did not entail a simple, effective remedy to determine the rights of the victims involved. 196. Finally, with respect to the fourth factor involving the question of whether the duration of the proceedings has produced an adverse effect on the legal situation of the persons involved, the Court has said on this point that the determination of whether the amount of time is reasonable needs to consider the adverse effect of the duration of the proceedings on the legal situation of the person involved, bearing in mind, among other elements, the matter in dispute. This Court has thus held that if the passage of time has a significant impact on the legal situation of the individual, the proceedings should be carried out more expeditiously so that the case is decided as soon as possible.194 In the instant case, the Court has already stated that the pretrial detention of the accused exceeded a reasonable period (supra par. 135). In this regard, the Court holds that in fact, during the time the accused were being held in pretrial detention, the State was under obligation to exercise greater diligence in investigating and prosecuting the case in order to prevent any disproportional damage to their freedom. 197. Based on all this, the Court concludes that the State failed to take a reasonable amount of time to try the accused, in violation of article 8(1) of the Convention, read in conjunction with article 1(1) thereof, in injury of Mr. Allendes, Mr. Argüelles, Mr. Aracena, Mr. Arancibia, Mr. Candurra, Mr. Cardozo, Mr. Di Rosa, Mr. Galluzzi, Mr. Giordano, Mr. Machín, Mr. Maluf, Mr. Marcial, Mr. Mattheus, Mr. Mercau, Mr. Morón, Mr. Muñoz, Mr. Óbolo, Mr. Pérez, Mr. Pontecorvo and Mr. Tomasek. VIII-3 PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM FROM EX POST FACTO LAWS A. Arguments of the parties 198. Representatives De Vita and Cueto made reference to the July 30, 1991 decision by the Supreme Court, rescinding the National Appeals Chamber's December 5, 1990 declaration that the criminal action for the crimes of military fraud and forgery under the Code of Military Justice had lapsed under the statute of limitations, in the understanding that the conduct “[did] not constitute specifically military crimes per se, which meant that the case would be 194 Cfr. Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, par. 155, and Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, par. 115.