37 detention becomes punitive rather than precautionary, which perverts the measure and breaches article 8(2) of the Convention.147 132. The dates to be used in determining the duration of pretrial detention in the instant case, in the context of jurisdiction of the Court, are September 5, 1984, when Argentina ratified the American Convention and recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, through 1987, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ordered the release of the 16 remaining applicants by means of Decision number 429/87. 133. The Court takes note that articles 309, 310 and 312 of the former Code of Military Justice were the legal instruments governing the arrests and pretrial detention of the accused. However, as the Commission and the Inter-American Defenders stressed, there were no provisions setting a maximum term or criteria for the release of a person held in detention beyond a reasonable period. 134. The prison convictions handed down to the applicants from the court of last resort were: (i) Galluzzi: 7 years in prison; (ii) Morón: 6 years in prison; (iii) Mercau and Maluf: 5 years in prison; (iv) Tomasek, Machín, Aracena and Candurra: 4 years, 6 months in prison; (v) Di Rosa: 4 years in prison; (vi) Pontecorvo, Giordano, Argüelles, Cardozo, Muñoz and Óbolo: 3 years, 6 months in prison; (vii) Arancibia: 3 years in prison, and (viii) Pérez, 2 years, 1 day in prison. Finally, Mr. Marcial was acquitted (supra par. 94). 135. The Court is also aware that in fact, the 18 alleged victims in pretrial detention until 1987 had remained in confinement for approximately four years after the Court’s jurisdiction began (supra par.71). The Court therefore holds that the periods ranging from two and a half years to two years, 11 months when they remained in pretrial detention following the initiation of the Court’s jurisdiction148 and during which time the legal status of the accused was not resolved, exceeded the reasonable time requirements set forth in article 7(5) of the Convention. The Court would underscore a further example of the unreasonable length of time in pretrial detention in the instant case, to wit, that the amount of time several of the applicants remained in detention exceeded the sentences they were eventually given (supra par. 134). 136. Pretrial detention is also limited by the principle of proportionality, by virtue of which a person presumed innocent cannot be treated the same as or worse than a convicted person. The State must avoid imposing a measure of procedural coercion equally or more injurious to the defendant than the punishment to be expected in case of conviction.149 The Court deems that the State should have ordered less severe measures, especially because the maximum prison sentence for the crime of which they were accused was ten years, 150 and bearing in mind that by September, 1984, the process was no longer in the early stages. This means that the pretrial detentions were in fact a premature sentence, and the accused were held in 147 Cfr. Case of Bayarri V. Argentina, par. 110 and 111, and Case of Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, Members and Activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile, par. 310 to 312. 148 Mr. Galuzzi, Mr. Pontecorvo, Mr. Di Rosa, Mr. Giordano, Mr. Tomasek, Mr. Machín, Mr. Mercau, Mr. Aracena, Mr. Maluf, Mr. Candurra, Mr. Arancibia, Mr. Morón, Mr. Argüelles, Mr. Pérez, Mr. Muñoz and Mr. Marcial were in custody for 2 years, 11 months and 10 days; Mr. Cardozo, for 2 years, 10 months and 21 days and Mr. Óbolo, 2 years, 6 months and 27 days (merits file, folios 2073 to 2084). 149 150 Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, par. 122. Code of Military Justice (Law 14.029, July 4, 1951): “ARTICLE 845. – Military fraud shall be sanctioned with up to ten years of incarceration or imprisonment and full and permanent disqualification, notwithstanding the provisions of article 590. [...]” (evidence file, folio 12972).