42 through legally established procedures, having functional independence and not coming under the hierarchy of the executive branch, in accordance with the provisions of article 8 subparagraph 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights.”169 155. Expert witness Miguel Lovatón, in turn, explained that the dual, simultaneous status as military judge and officer was incompatible with the principle of balance of powers and judicial independence. Along the same lines, the expert witness explained that it would be unacceptable for a judge to be simultaneously answerable to and a member of the executive branch, most particularly, to a hierarchical and subordinate structure such as the Armed Forces; under the circumstances, it would be impossible speak of judicial independence because the judge would be subject to a military structure incompatible with guarantees of independence.170 156. Now, unlike the earlier cases judged by the Court, here there is no dispute as to whether the crimes were military in nature. The facts of the case clearly show that the military jurisdiction was used to investigate active-duty members of the Argentine Air Force for crimes of fraud and forgery of military documentation. In addition to the status of the alleged victims as active-duty military, the interest of the military criminal justice system was to protect military assets, grounded in the Military Code of Justice (the law already in effect at the time) such that the jurisdiction handed to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was not contrary to the Convention. 157. With respect to the independence of the military court that tried this case, the Court notes that neither the process of appointment, the term lengths nor the qualifications of the members of the Supreme Council (article 14 of the Code of Military Justice 171) was challenged during the domestic proceedings or in the arguments submitted to the Inter-American system, so the Court will not judge the matter. 158. Moreover, although there had been no specific arguments about the lack of independence among members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in the performance of their duties in this particular case, the Court believes that the very fact that the people sitting on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces were active-duty military and were answerable and subordinate to their superiors, who were part of the executive branch, calls into question their independence and objectivity.172 159. The Court would also note that the Code of Military Justice at the time did not require legal training for six of the nine people serving as judges or members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (article 12, CJM). None of this would be a problem for a strictly administrative or disciplinary panel, but it falls short of the standards given in article 8(2) of the American Convention for specifically criminal matters. 173 160. After the case was processed by the military courts, the mandatory remedies were lodged in the general jurisdiction (supra par. 83). This was in compliance with the 1984 reforms to the Code of Military Justice, whose article 445-bis introduced a procedure for 169 Statement by expert witness Armando Bonadeo (merits file, folio 1887). 170 Statement by expert witness Miguel Lovatón Palacios (merits file, folio 1835 and 1836). 171 Code of Military Justice, article 14 – “The members of the Supreme Council shall be appointed by the President; they shall remain in the position for six years and be eligible for reelection. They must take an oath of office before a quorum of members of the council. This oath will be taken by the chief justice of the court.” 172 Cfr. Case of La Cantuta v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2006. Series C No. 162, par. 141, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, par. 188. 173 Cfr. Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, par. 155.