occurred; in other words, the existence of possible defects of consent.” According to the
representatives, the consent of most of the depositors was invalid when it was given,
because “it had been obtained by error or by fraud, both of which were reasons to annul
consent under Uruguayan law”. They argued that the evidence required of the alleged
victims to prove the absence of consent in the transfer of their funds to offshore
accounts “should [have been] reasonable and objective, and should not [have]
constitute[d] an obstacle to the transparent implementation of the procedure established
for the recovery of their assets.”
152. In this regard, the State explained how the existence or absence of consent was
determined in application of article 31 of Law 17,613. It indicated that “the basic norms
and principles that regulate any relationship involving a mandate, power of attorney or
commission [were applied]: the person exercising the mandate, power of attorney or
commission may exercise all the powers that have been conferred on him by the
mandate, power of attorney or commission, but may not act against the express
instructions of the person granting the mandate, power of attorney or commission, even
in the matters covered by the mandate, power of attorney or commission.” The State
emphasized that, in the wording of article 31 of Law 17,613, the legislator decided “not
to declare, in general, that […] the investors in TCB Cayman should be considered as
depositors in those banks upon their liquidation.” According to the State “[t]he legislator
was seeking to limit the recognition as depositors of the Banco de Montevideo to those
who, being previously depositors in the Banco de Montevideo S.A., did not know, were
unaware of and, consequently, had not given their consent for their money to be
transferred to TCB Cayman.” It was “immaterial to the legislator that they had not
understood the risks of the operation […], or that they had not asked about its legal and
financial consequences.” The State explained that article 31 of Law 17,613 “does not
require either express or written consent, but merely consent [so that] verbal consent is
valid and implied consent is valid.”
Considerations of the Court
153. The analysis of the decisions of the Board of the Central Bank and of the
Contentious-Administrative Tribunal reveals that the requirements of article 31 of Law
17,613 were: (1) to be a “depositor” of the Banco de Montevideo or the Banco La Caja
Obrera; (2) whose savings had been transferred to other institutions, and (3) without
his consent.
154. Regarding the first requirement, analysis of the documentary, expert and
testimonial evidence reveals that the term “depositor” [ahorrista] did not have a legal or
objective definition that would allow its standardized application. Regarding its
interpretation and application by the Central Bank, when testifying before the Court, a
member of the Advisory Commission and the Chairman of the Board of the Central Bank
at the time of the facts, explained that this involved having a bank deposit.230 In this
regard, commissioner Duran Martínez added that “[c]lassic deposits are: a savings,
checking or fixed-term account,” and that, in addition, those with a special account
known as on-demand deposits for share trading “were also considered depositors.”
Nevertheless, the Court has verified that, in many cases corresponding to the alleged
victims, the Central Bank rejected their claims on the basis, inter alia, that the
documentation presented by the petitioners did not prove that their savings were placed
in the Banco de Montevideo in a checking, fixed-term or savings account,” so that “it
was not appropriate to analyze whether or not there had been express consent to the
transfer of their savings to another institution when […] the prior existence of a bank
230
Cf. Affidavit of the witness Julio de Brun dated February 16, 2011 (merits file, volume II, folios 1101
and 1105), and testimony of the witness Augusto Durán Martínez during the public hearing in this case.
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