the Court takes note that, on numerous occasions, the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal stated that article 31 of Law 17,613 was exceptional, so that its interpretation should be restrictive, in the sense that it should only cover those situations in which the requirements established in article 31 were satisfied cumulatively (supra para. 104). It further stated that these requirements “sought to cover specific situations, limiting the recognition as a Banco de Montevideo depositor to those who did not know, were unaware of, or had not given their consent to their money being transferred [to other institutions].” Also, the parliamentary discussions reveal that the Central Bank was ordered to create a commission to help verify which of the depositors of the Banco de Montevideo and the Banco La Caja Obrera had really been deceived (supra para. 135). 158. Taking in account the above-mentioned elements, the Court finds that, if the intention behind article 31 of Law 17,613 had been to protect all the “depositors” whose funds had been used to acquire certificates of deposit or shares in certificates of deposit of other institutions, as the representatives argue, the wording of the norm would have indicated this. To the contrary, the wording of this article implies the need to determine the absence of consent to the operation in each case. 159. Regarding the arguments of the Inter-American Commission and the representatives concerning the application of presumptions to determine consent, the Court observes that when applying this article, the Board of the Central Bank and the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal do not refer to presumptions of consent. From the decisions provided to the case file of the instant case, the Court has verified that these bodies analyzed or assessed the evidence provided to them to determine whether consent had been given, granting probative value to elements such as signed contracts for the administration of investments or specific instructions, or the absence of objections to bank statements. The Court does not have information, and it is not incumbent upon it, to decide on the legality of the domestic norms or of the banking norms and practice under which these elements could be interpreted as an expression of consent. 160. Hence, the Court concludes that the actions of the said bodies, when ruling on the requirement of absence of consent based on these elements, do not, in themselves, constitute a violation of the alleged victims’ guarantees of due process. However, for other reasons, the Court concluded in section B.1 of this chapter that, in the determination of the said requirement, the administrative body violated the material sphere of the victims’ right to be heard, because it failed to make a complete analysis (supra paras. 133 to 142). Regarding the arguments of the Inter-American Commission and the representatives of the alleged victims that the Contentious-Administrative Tribunal did not analyze the arguments and evidence on defects of consent and the absence of complete and truthful information, the Court will rule in this regard when deciding on the effectiveness of the appeal for annulment before the ContentiousAdministrative Tribunal (infra paras. 200 to 220). 161. Additionally, regarding the Central Bank’s assessment of the failure to contest the bank statements in relation to the requirement of absence of consent, the representatives of the alleged victims argued that “according to banking operational norms, what is accepted in a statement, which is a unilateral document of the bank, is the balance and not the transfer of money to another bank.” 162. In this regard, the Court has verified that, in the cases of at least 39 victims, the Board of the Central Bank rejected their claims based only on the client’s absence of objection to the statements and, in some cases, also the person’s “regularity” in carrying out the operation – which is also derived from these statements – even though that person had one of the accounts that are generally recognized as typical of depositors 65