167. For their part, the representatives indicated that they endorsed the arguments of the Inter-American Commission concerning the alleged violations of Article 8(1) of the Convention in relation to the alleged new criterion applied by the Advisory Commission. In addition, the representatives indicated that the State had violated the alleged victims’ right to equal protection by the law “by applying certain rules of law […] arbitrarily and discriminately in the context of the procedure before the Advisory Commission.” They indicated that the remedy established in article 31 of Law 17,613 “was appropriate for only 22 depositors who benefited from special considerations that [the alleged victims] could have enjoyed had it not been for the discriminatory and arbitrary action of the Advisory Commission.” The representatives also argued that “[t]he violation of judicial guarantees and judicial protection inevitably results in a violation of the principle of equal protection by the law”; but that, in addition, this violation is also constituted autonomously, “from the moment that 22 [cases] out of 1,400 are successful based on legal grounds or evidence that could be applied or used by the remainder and was not.” They insisted that, when interpreting the said article 31, “[r]easonable and objective criteria were not used to analyze the cases of the depositors,” and that “by acting in a discriminatory manner in the use of its own criteria against a whole group of depositors, [the Advisory Commission] also violated the principle of equality before the law.” According to the representatives, “[t]he mere verification of [the said] different treatment in relation to a whole group of people is sufficient proof that it acted in a discriminatory manner.” They indicated that the State had not offered the same possibilities to those who filed claims before the Central Bank under article 31 of Law 17,613 in relation to the presentation of evidence and the rules applicable to the said procedure, which “is not only a violation of due process [… but also] a violation of the principle of equal protection by the law.” 168. Regarding the requirements established in article 31 of Law 17,613, the State considered that the same criteria had been applied to all the cases, requiring them to fulfill the requirements indicated in said norm and, “in none of the cases had new requirements been established over and above those that existed in the legal framework.” It considered that what the Inter-American Commission had identified as “new requirements” were merely the assessment of the evidence submitted by the depositors in relation to the requirements that arose clearly from the law. Thus, “[t]he difference between the [petitioners] accepted and those rejected was not that different requirements were applied to them, but [that] […] the petitioners whose claims were accepted were able to prove the absence of consent, eliminating what the InterAmerican Commission refers to as ‘presumptions’ or ‘disqualifying facts.’” The State explained how it had applied the criteria to determine consent, and referred to the situations alleged by the Inter-American Commission concerning the alleged arbitrary application of criteria (supra para. 165). In addition, even though the State contested the examination of the alleged violation of Article 24 of the Convention (supra para. 34), it also argued that “[i]n all the cases that were successful, the [Advisory] Commission understood – based on the evidence produced when the claim or the appeal was presented – that the petitioners’ placements had been made or renewed without their consent; in other words, there was evidence that they did not wish to renew them and – nevertheless – they were renewed.” To the contrary, “in the other claims […] the express or implied consent of the investor to the placement made and its successive renewals was proved.” In response to the President of the Court’s request for additional information, the State indicated that, from the analysis of the files before the Central Bank, there was only one case in which testimonial evidence had been offered specifically to prove orders not to renew that this evidence had not been received, and this had occurred because the proposed witness failed to appear. Nevertheless, it indicated that the “analysis made reveal[ed] a situation of arbitrariness in the way in which the procedure was administered, but [that was] insufficient to determine that there was discrimination, as established in Article 24 of the Convention.” 68