the time of the facts could not be characterized as different from the prohibition that exists in the American Convention, or “too broad” as the State has suggested. 310. In addition, the jurisprudence of Brazil’s high courts provided to the Court during the litigation of this case by both the State and the representatives, witnesses, deponents for information purpose, and expert witnesses reveals that the fundamental factor for the Brazilian courts to determine the existence of a situation analogous to that of a slave before the definition of the offense was amended in 2003 was the deprivation of the worker’s liberty. The interpretation of the prohibition of slavery in the original article 149 of the Penal Code indicated that there must be a restriction of the victims’ liberty, a fact confirmed in this case based on the threats, violence and debt bondage that existed in Hacienda Brasil Verde (supra para. 304). In addition, the existence of extenuating work, degrading living conditions, falsification of documents and the presence of minors were verified. This totally contradicts the State’s argument that the workers were free to leave the hacienda. Consequently, the State’s argument that the facts could characterize slavery only under domestic laws – and not based on international law – is groundless. 311. Second, it is important to point out that, if a country enacts laws that are more protective of the individual, as could be understood by the prohibition of slavery under Brazil’s legal system in 2003, the Court cannot restrict its analysis of the specific situation based on a law that grants less protection. This is the meaning of Article 29 of the American Convention, which stipulates: Article 29. Restrictions regarding Interpretation No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have. 312. A literal reading of paragraph (b) of Article 29 clearly reveals that the Convention does not permit an interpretation that limits the enjoyment and exercise of human rights. 447 The pro persona interpretation requires the Court to interpret the human rights recognized in the American Convention in light of the most protective norm to which the persons under its jurisdiction are subject. 313. Lastly, the Court points out that the recent jurisprudence of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court accords with the ruling of the Inter-American Court in this case. The decisions handed down during this litigation reveal that the Supreme Labor Court and the Supreme Federal Court interpret situations analogous to slavery responsibly, making it clear that a mere violation of the labor laws does not reach the threshold of reduction to slavery; rather the II. maintain constant surveillance in the place of work, or appropriate workers’ personal papers or property in order to retain them at the place of work. 2. The penalty shall be increased by half if the offense is committed: I. against a child or adolescent; II. based on race, color, ethnicity, religion or origin. Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Administrative Contentious Court”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 218, and Case of Ruano Torres et al. v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series C No. 303, para. 29. 447 80